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International Criminal Law’s Millennium of Forgotten History
Ziv Bohrer
This article challenges the consensus that International Criminal Law (ICL) was “born” at Nuremberg,
exposing ICL’s true history, which spans centuries. Jurists regard pre-WWII cases of penal enforcement
of the laws of war as unrelated to present-day ICL, because, presumably, these cases are: (1) rare, (2)
domestic measures that (3) lack a common doctrine. That is false. ICL’s development, from the late
Middle-Ages until WWII, has been grounded on a transnational doctrine which considered as
international “outlaws” (punishable by all) violators of the laws of war (war criminals) and of certain
additional international laws (from which “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace”
developed). Remnants of this doctrine are still present in ICL. Penal action against violators was nonnegligible and the forums that executed it were not mere domestic organs. After presenting ICL’s
centuries-long history and the causes of its pretermission, the article concludes that this forgotten past
must be acknowledged. The current narrative falsely depicts ICL as an abnormal system, recently created
in violation of basic principles of criminal justice. Furthermore, it encourages the disregard of most ICL
cases (those conducted at the State level). Hence, this “false history” leads to unjustifiable questioning of
ICL’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
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At the close of WWII, Churchill suggested summarily executing the remaining Nazi
leadership. Roosevelt disagreed, insisting on prosecuting them in an international military
tribunal. This is considered the “birth” of International Criminal Law (ICL),1 following a
consensus that “[t]he Nazi atrocities gave rise to the idea that some crimes are so grave as to
concern the international community as a whole.”2 Few earlier instances of penal action against
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violators of the laws of war are acknowledged. But, they are dismissed as unrelated to current
ICL, because (presumably) they are sporadic domestic actions that lack a common doctrine.3
The present article challenges this construction of ICL history. Pre-WWII penal enforcement
of the laws of war was: (a) non-negligible; (b) in all instances the same transnational doctrine
(still part of ICL to some extent) was applied; and (c) the forums that tried the perpetrators were
not merely domestic organs. Furthermore, “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace”
(“aggression”) also have a long pre-WWII history. Simply put, notwithstanding the significance
of post-WWII trials, ICL history stretches for nearly a millennium.
Part 1 discusses preliminary indications that pre-WWII penal enforcement of the laws of war
was doctrinally related to post-WWII ICL, pointing to evidence of “outlawry” as a common
doctrinal thread. Parts 2 and 3 discuss methodological issues. Parts 4 and 5 trace the origins of
the outlawry doctrine and its relation to ICL. Part 6 discusses the pre-WWII history of Crimes
Against Humanity. Part 7 explores key reasons for the predominance of the current narrative
about ICL history. Part 8 exposes the harms caused by the current historical misperception.
1. Acknowledged Pre-WWII Cases
When ICL’s history is currently described, only six pre-WWII events are typically noted:
the medieval trials of Conradin, King of Jerusalem (1268), William Wallace (1305) and Peter
von-Hagenbach (1474) for violating the “laws of God and man” (a term used for centuries to
describe international law); the proposal to execute Napoleon for starting war in violation of
international commitments (1815); the adoption (1863) and enforcement of the Lieber Code
during the American Civil War (1861-1865); and the WWI proposals to prosecute the Kaiser and
other German war criminals. Yet, after being briefly noted, these cases are usually deemed
irrelevant to present-day ICL, mainly for being sporadic and lacking a common legal doctrine.4
Piracy is the only international crime with a recognized pedigree, due to the application of
the same transnational doctrine for centuries across nations. According to this doctrine, universal
jurisdiction applies because “a pirate [is] an outlaw [and] a ‘hostis humani generis’ [enemy of
mankind]” for violating international law.5 That doctrine contained, until recently, additional
elements: (a) pirates were referred to by synonyms6 of the term “outlaws”, such as “disturbers of
3
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the peace”7 and “enemies of peace”8; (b) death was the universal maximum sentence for piracy
and it was executed summarily or following a military trial.9
Currently, universal jurisdiction applies also to perpetrators of “core international crimes”
(“War Crimes,” “Crimes Against Humanity,” “Crimes Against Peace” (“Aggression”), and
“Genocide”), which, presumably, turns “the power of criminal punishment against the hostis
humani generis, the enemy of mankind, the universal outlaw, expressions historically associated
with the pirate.”10 Namely, the application of universal jurisdiction to such crimes is assumed to
be a post-WWII development accomplished by adopting the international outlawry doctrine from
piracy law. But, examination of the six pre-WWII cases reveals a recurring “outlawry format”,
suggesting a centuries-long application of a transnational doctrine, similar to piracy law.
Contemporary jurists depict Conradin’s case (1268) as an ancient conviction for “crimes
against peace”, as he was tried for instigating an unjust war (due to papal opposition) to become
the King of Sicily.11 This depiction ignores that Conradin was convicted by a panel of knights
(military tribunal) and executed as “a disturber of the public peace [i.e. outlaw]… and the
usurper of a kingdom, which the pope had granted to another.”12 In some accounts, Conradin was
further held “responsible for all the excesses [i.e. war crimes] of [his] German soldiery.”13
Conradin’s Execution14

According to 14th-century jurist Giovanni da-Legnano, Conradin was beheaded because “disturbance of
the peace [was] not feared.”15
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In what jurists commonly describe as “the earliest recorded trial… for war crimes,”16
William Wallace was tried in 1305, for “sparing neither age nor sex, monk nor nun” in a Scottish
campaign he led against England. Conradin’s earlier war crimes conviction refutes this.
Moreover, an outlawry format has currently gone unnoticed: “Wallace was drawn for treason,
hanged for robbery and homicide, disemboweled for sacrilege, beheaded as an outlaw and
quartered for divers[e] depredations,”17 after being convicted by a military tribunal.18
Wallace’s Trial19

King Edward in a letter to the Pope referred to Wallace and his men as “enemies of peace.”20
Peter von-Hagenbach was appointed governor of Breisach by the Duke of Burgundy, who
had conquered it for ransom. As governor, von-Hagenbach orchestrated atrocities against locals.
Current ICL scholarship describes that, in 1474, after the occupation ended, he was sentenced to
death for murder, rape, and other crimes against the laws of God, by a tribunal comprised of
judges from several princedoms. Some, therefore, consider this case the earliest trial by a
15
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transnational criminal tribunal and the only one before Nuremberg.21 Contemporary jurists rarely
mention that von-Hagenbach was tried by a military tribunal and convicted of tyranny. 22 The
tyranny conviction is significant because for centuries, such charges rendered individuals “hostes
humani generis--international outlaws--who fall within the scope of ‘universal jurisdiction’ and,
as the way of pirates, were ‘to be hanged by the first persons into whose hands they fall.’”23
Von-Hagenbach’s Beheading24

Von-Hagenbach is still remembered as a tyrant. The French Moments tourism site, e.g., states
that “a focal point [in Colmar’s Unterlinden Museum] is the mummified head of local tyrant,
Peter von-Hagenbach.”25
Napoleon’s case (1815) is often presented as a failed attempt to punish a perpetrator of
“crimes against peace”. The reality was more complex. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna, an
international body representing most European countries, declared Napoleon “an Enemy and
Disturber of the Tranquility of the World [i.e. outlaw], that he has incurred public vengeance,”
for “violating the convention which established him in the Island of Elba” and “reappearing in
21
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France with projects of disorder and destruction”.26 The British Prime Minister argued that
Napoleon could be considered a “captain of freebooters or banditti and consequently out of the
pale of protection of nations [that] headed his expedition as an outlaw and an outcast; hostis
humani generis.”27 Prussian Field-Marshal Blucher declared Napoleon an “outlaw,” wanted dead
or alive.28 Eventually, Napoleon was captured and perpetually detained without trial “for the
Preservation of the Tranquility of Europe.”29
Napoleon’s Outlawry

An 1813 pamphlet, asserting, based on international law, that Napoleon should be declared
an outlaw.30
Notice that the British Prime Minister equated Napoleon to a pirate (“freebooter”) over a
century before WWII. This contradicts the premise that the link between core international
crimes and piracy is a recent development. Furthermore, by comparing Napoleon to a bandit, he
was using a term then applied, together with “brigands” and “bush-whackers,” to unlawful
combatants, toward whom an international outlawry doctrine had also been employed for
centuries.31 During the American Civil War, e.g., the Union routinely deemed Southern unlawful
26
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combatants “outlaws”/“enemies of mankind” and executed them summarily or following a
military trial.32
The Union’s Outlawry of Confederate Irregulars

A Union military decree, referring to Confederate irregulars as the “common foe of
mankind” and declaring that they would be hung upon capture as they are “entitled to none
of the rights accorded by the laws of war to honorable belligerents.”33
Outlawry was invoked by the Union also with regard to regular Southern soldiers who had
violated the laws of war, as in the case of Confederate Captain Henry Wirz. Horrific atrocities
were committed during Wirz’s command of the Andersonville POW camp. After the war, he was
sentenced to death by a military commission for conspiring with others “to injure the health and
destroy the lives of… prisoners of war… in violation of the law of war.”34 At trial, the JudgeAdvocate declared that the conspirators had “forfeited all rights… they are outlaws and
criminals.”35
32
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Wirz’s Execution36

It is difficult to dismiss something as insignificant when it is carried out on Capitol Hill.
Similarly, the Confederates deemed Northern soldiers they accused of war crimes outlaws.
For example, Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, accused Union General, Benjamin Butler,
of violating the laws of war by executing certain Southern civilians, and declared that Butler
would be summarily executed if captured, as “an outlaw and common enemy of mankind.”37
Outlawry was often invoked in reference to German WWI submariners for their attacks on
civilian ships. For example, in his congressional declaration of war, President Wilson stated that
because of their “wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants… [t]he
present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind” and
“[b]ecause [German] submarines are in effect outlaws… [i]t is… necessity indeed, to endeavour
to destroy them before they have shown their own intention.”38
Outlawry was also applied in reference to the Kaiser. During a British War Cabinet meeting,
in 1918, Lord Curzon reported that French Prime Minister Clemenceau had suggested “treating
the Kaiser as a universal outlaw [for violating international law] so that there should be no land

36
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in which he could set his foot.”39 Subsequently, the Cabinet appointed a legal commission, which
concluded that international law authorized punishing the Kaiser either by trial or summarily “as
Napoleon was treated.”40
WWI
German Submariners’ Outlawry

The Kaiser’s Outlawry

Part of a report from The Evening Post 13 Part of a report from The Dominion 6 (Sep. 8,
1917): “the Kaiser and his War lords… may
(April 14, 1917).41
well dream of… banishment, or even a felon’s
death. America… marks them as the outlaws
of our civilization.”
39
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Recall the event commonly described as the “birth” of ICL: Roosevelt’s opposition to
Churchill’s summary execution proposal. The basis of Churchill’s proposal was “the oldfashioned idea of the ‘outlaw’”.42 He suggested that a committee of jurists compile a list of archwar-criminals who would be deemed international outlaws by a joint decree of the Allies, and if
one of them were to fall into Allied hands, the nearest Major-General would convene a Court of
Inquiry, not to determine guilt but “to establish the fact of identification [after which the] officer
will have the outlaw or outlaws shot to death within six hours and without reference to higher
authority.”43 Churchill’s idea of summarily executing war criminals within six hours from
capture “became the policy of the British government from 1943 until the very end of the war.”44
Supporters of Roosevelt’s tribunal proposition also relied on outlawry. An American
Memorandum from 1944 on the “Trial of War Criminal by Mixed Inter-Allied Military
Tribunals” stated that “[i]t is fundamental in considering th[e] question [of universal jurisdiction]
to bear in mind that for the past century at least war crim[inals]… have been considered…
‘enemies of mankind’… ‘hostis humani generis’… ‘outlaws’”.45
WWII

42
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In sum, an outlawry format similar to that of piracy cases is present in all commonly
recognized pre-WWII war crimes cases, challenging the premise that these were not part of the
doctrinal evolution that produced current ICL.
2. The “Modern State Conception” and Nineteenth-Century Positivism
It is intuitively assumed that criminal justice systems must have a centralized lawenforcement structure, because no such system “execute[s] the penal laws of another.” 46 Penal
laws are also assumed to be generally aimed at protecting the interests of the legal system’s local
community, which often places jurisdictional (usually territorial) limits on their enforcement.
These laws are further expected to be formally legislated by an official body.47 Put differently, it
is intuitively assumed that: “Criminal justice presupposes sovereign States”.48
But, as Hathaway and Shapiro pointed out, this “Modern State Conception is both an
excessively narrow and historically incomplete account of law. Legal systems can and have
existed despite lacking the capacities of a modern state.”49 In pre-State Germanic tribes, e.g.,
penal law was unlegislated and law-enforcement was outsourced by entitling everyone to extrajudicially kill criminals.50 Moreover, not only obsolete legal systems are characterized by
decentralization.

Contemporary

international

law

shares

considerable

attributes

of

decentralization with pre-State Germanic legal systems. Scholars have pointed out this fact to
refute the claim of international law’s opponents that it is not truly a legal system due to
dissimilarities between it and modern domestic legal systems.51 Support for this unjustified delegitimation of international law is considerably due to the intuitive endorsement of the “Modern
State Conception.”
The inaccuracy of this conception is further evident in the fact that even some contemporary
domestic systems exhibit elements of decentralization. In Scotland, the legislative function is
somewhat decentralized, as some crimes are unlegislated and judges have inherent “declaratory
power” to “find” additional conduct to be criminal.52 Many Continental European systems
46
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48
Ibid.
49
Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, “Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law,” Yale Law
Journal 121 (2011): 258.
50
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support some decentralization of law-enforcement through judex loci deprehensionis, a doctrine
which allows, under certain conditions, prosecuting foreigners for committing acts defined as
crimes by the foreign law of their place of commission, even if the prosecuting State and its
citizens were not affected by these acts.53
It is not completely coincidental that these domestic systems exhibit attributes that partially
resemble Germanic systems, as they have originated from such systems. Interestingly, the
Germanic doctrine that served as the basis for the outsourcing of law-enforcement was outlawry,
which originally permitted killing on-sight anyone deemed an “outlaw” for having committed a
grave crime.54 This doctrine’s conflation, during the late Middle-Ages, with somewhat similar
Roman-Christian doctrines is recognized as pivotal to the development of domestic criminal
justice, and more generally, to the rise of the modern State.55 As this article reveals, international
law’s resemblance to Germanic systems is similarly non-coincidental; ICL’s history, which is
much longer than assumed, is also bound to the outlawry doctrine.
The intuitive endorsement of the “Modern State Conception” is a main cause for the
disregard of ICL’s long history. Nineteenth-century positivism has propagated this flawed
conception of legal systems, as many positivists maintained that penal law is “necessarily of a
positive, local existence”.56 Nineteenth-century positivism has motivated considerable reforms in
domestic law. As a result, most criminal justice systems came to resemble the model many
positivists supported, and they still maintain these qualities, despite the fact that positivism itself
no longer supports the narrow perception of legal systems that nineteenth-century positivists
commonly supported.57 Individuals unconsciously tend to generalize from personal experiences
and prevailing paradigms, and presently “the legal systems…most familiar [to us] are domestic
[and] modern state regimes are the paradigm instances of law.”58 This unconscious tendency and
the contribution of nineteenth-century positivism to the shaping of contemporary domestic

53
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55
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Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (1998), 63.
56
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also, J.F. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), 2:62-63.
57
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58
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systems jointly lead to the intuitive reliance on the “Modern State Conception.” Uncovering
ICL’s long, outlawry-related history demands confronting this flawed conception. Therefore, I
mention and refute various nineteenth-century positivist propositions throughout the article.
To clarify, nineteenth-century positivism was a diverse jurisprudential school, whose
proponents’ positions regarding international law considerably varied. 59 This article is bound to
fail to do full justice to this diversity due to space constraints, which necessitate focusing on antiICL, nineteenth-century positivist views, as these played a significant role in the pretermission of
ICL history. Interestingly, even these positions varied in their attitude toward international law.
Austin, the period’s leading positivist, defined “law” as a command backed by threats of
sanctions issued by a sovereign. Based on this definition, he concluded that international law (not
only ICL) is not “law” but mere “positive international morality.”60 Others adopted a dualistic
position that perceives domestic and international law as two substantially different legal
systems, the former regulating individuals and the latter coordinating between States. This
perspective still rejects ICL, because ICL is addressed to individuals.61
3. Genealogical Accounts
This article gradually presents ICL’s long history and uncovers its persistent reliance on
outlawry. But, some international legal historians are averse to such genealogical accounts of the
origins of contemporary international norms and institutions, due to the teleological and
anachronistic tendencies of such accounts.62 Genealogical accounts also tend to mistakenly
regard the original application of a doctrine as the explanation for each of its iterations, even
though tracing back a doctrine’s iterations up to the first application does not provide such an
explanation. It only raises the question: why was the same doctrine applied in all of the different
instances?63
Some argue that in each instance a legal doctrine is applied because of the case-specific,
non-legal interests of the powerful, and the pretense of applying a long-standing legal doctrine is
used to conceal these non-legal interests.64 Others argue that even if domestic law can affect the
59
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European Journal of International law 12 (2001): 271.
60
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61
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62
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International Law, ed. Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi (2007), 34.
63
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behavior of the powerful, international law cannot.65 If one of these views is correct, a
genealogical account of ICL is uninteresting because each application of ICL is “truly”
determined by the case-specific power balance.66
Yet, there is nothing necessarily anachronistic or teleological about a genealogical account,67
especially when it concludes that “we are looking at a continuum, albeit not a linear one. While
there have been important discontinuities along the way these do not lead to what might be
termed a dis-continuum.”68 As Bourdieu further pointed out, “[t]he social practices of the law
are… the product of the functioning of a ‘field’ whose specific logic is determined by two
factors:… the specific power relations [and] the internal logic of juridical functioning which
constantly constrains the range of possible actions and, thereby, limits the realm of specifically
juridical solutions.”69 Although the pre-existence of a legal doctrine is usually not the sole reason
for any of its iterations, it may provide a partial explanation for each such iteration, because such
“past gives us vocabulary, and that vocabulary in turn shapes the very way we think of a
problem”.70 In ICL’s case, the relevant vocabulary depicts violators of certain international laws
as enemies of mankind/outlaws. Laws, therefore, often have effects that go beyond concealing
non-legal motivations and even the powerful are susceptible to such effects. This is true for both
domestic and international law.71 Thus, the history of the independent effect of international laws
should be researched, and genealogical accounts are crucial for such research because the
internal logic of the law relies “upon precedent, customs and patterns of argument stretching
back [in time].”72
Admittedly, during power struggles, legal uncertainty often exists, as opponents tend to
disagree on the interpretation of the relevant law. But the law still has some influence, forcing
the sides to structure their claims in a certain manner and limiting the legitimate interpretational
possibilities.73 Jus ad bellum, for example, because of the strategic issues it addresses, has always
been more exposed to power struggles than most other laws of war. Its norms, therefore, often
65

Samuel Moyn, “Of Deserts and Promised Lands: The Dream of Global Justice,” The Nation (Feb. 29, 2012)
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66
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70
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suffer from uncertainty and political “abuse.” But historical research of various centuries has
shown that even jus ad bellum often has independent influence.74
According to the genealogical account below, ICL continuously existed since the late
Middle-Ages. This could raise another inaccuracy concern, because many international legal
historians consider international law to be a late nineteenth-century innovation, pointing to
several points of discontinuity with earlier transnational law.75
One such claimed point of discontinuity is the transition from the European jus gentium to
the contemporary global system of international law.76 But, this transition, in the context of ICL,
did not occur in the form of a rupture. Originally, the European jus gentium (ICL included) was a
trans-Christian/European/Western system whose members (egocentrically) regarded themselves
as “mankind”/“humanity”,77 and it was prescribed to wage total war, without any jus in bello
restrictions,

against

non-Christian

nations,

which

were

referred

to

as

“uncivilized”/“barbarians”/“savages” (and for several centuries “infidels”).78
But, in practice, even during the late Middle-Ages and Early Modern Times, in some wars
between Christians/Europeans/Westerners and non-Christians/Europeans/Westerners, jus in bello
restrictions were applied.79 There are even such cross-cultural wars in which certain mutelyaccepted applications of ICL can be detected.80
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Case-specific political considerations explain, in part, the variation in conduct between
different cross-cultural wars.81 After all, determining that an enemy belonged to a category that
justified waging total war was an ad bellum legal matter and thus especially susceptible in its
application to the influence of such considerations.
Nevertheless, the law itself also had an influence in constraining war-time conduct in such
cross-cultural wars. “European thought about the law governing interactions among states and
peoples--ius gentium, law of nations, international law--has… always existed in a space of
tension between the European and the universal.”82 Due to this incoherent duality, throughout the
history of international law, both sources that conceptualized it as universally applicable and
sources that regarded it as only applicable to Christians/Europeans/Westerners existed; although,
the extent of support for each position (universalist or exclusionary) varied between different
periods.83 The likelihood that a decision to wage total war would be made, was, mostly likely,
influenced by the fluctuating support for universalist positions.84 It should also be noted that, due
to the influence of certain universalist positions, already before the late nineteenth century there
were some cases where ICL was applied on the basis of a universalist, human-rights-oriented
perspective.85
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A comparison of different accounts that depict the coming into being of the current global
system as resulting from a rupture reveals considerable discrepancy regarding the time in which
globalization has presumably occurred--with various dates, ranging from the late nineteenth
century to the 1970s, being suggested.86 As these issues are closely related,87 it is unsurprising
that a difficulty similarly exists in pin-pointing the time in which the ad bellum doctrine
permitting waging total war against non-Christians/Europeans/Westerners was abandoned.88
These difficulties are, at least in part, due to the fact that throughout this century-long period (as
in previous times), in some conflicts, all parties--Westerners and non-Westerners alike-recognized the applicability of the (originally European) laws of war,89 while in others, Western
belligerents waged total war against their non-Western opponents (some of them, in fact, up until
WWII, even explicitly justified their actions based on the horrid ad bellum doctrine regarding
“uncivilized” nations).90 Hence, the abandonment of the ad bellum doctrine regarding
“uncivilized” nations was clearly not the result of a rupture, but of a nonlinear, long process.
Not only jus ad bellum influenced decisions whether to wage total war. At times, the
conventional (originally European) jus in bello also had a moderating influence. Humanitarian
considerations embedded in these norms influenced the decision of at least some commanders
not to wage total war.91 Furthermore, once a decision was made not to wage total war (for
whatever reason), European forces often turned to the wartime legal code of conduct familiar to
them; although, due to the reciprocal nature of warfare, often, the norms familiar to the other side
also had an influence on the mutually adopted legal code of conduct.92 Since the eighteenth
century, however, as the power gap between European/Western forces and nonEuropean/Western forces grew, increasingly, the European norms were simply imposed upon
86
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non-European forces.93 The signing by non-Western countries on the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries codifying treaties of the laws of war further contributed to these norms’ globalization.94
The increasing adoption of the originally European jus in bello was not a linear process.95
Also, contrary to the way many Western jurists still wrongly imagine it to be, this process was
not the result of “civilization‘s” progression,96 but of various factors, many of them coercive,
such as: (a) forced acculturation; (b) the use of non-Western forces by Western/European
colonialist nations; and (c) the adoption of these laws by non-Western/European nations to
reduce Western/European nations’ ability to justify waging total war against them. 97 The
adoption of these originally European in bello laws by non-Western/European nations was
further influenced by the fact that “military culture [is] possessed of its own imitative
dynamics”,98 since “[w]ar is a competitive and reciprocal activity… [t]he common culture of
armed forces… has a function, whose robustness frequently prevails over national and political
differences.”99 As a result of the expanding adoption of these laws, most contemporary laws of
war are identical to, or gradually developed from, the past European laws of war. 100 Thus, in the
context of jus in bello as well, globalization did not occur in the form of a rupture.

It is agreed in the treaty that both pirates and killers of hors de combat “shall be accounted… enem[ies] of
all mankind” (implicitly regarding the latter by deeming the act a form of piracy).101
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Some international legal historians argue that international law was born only in the
nineteenth century due to the shift experienced from natural law jurisprudence to positivism,
which, presumably, rationalized international law.102 This claim is inaccurate. Positivism was not
the first jurisprudential school to claim to rationalize international law; secular natural law
preceded it, albeit claiming to attain this aim in a different manner.103 Furthermore, in nearly all
periods, including the nineteenth century, various jurisprudential schools existed, as well as
many positions within each school regarding obedience to international law. Moreover, jurists
who mainly followed a certain jurisprudential school often accepted elements of other schools.104
Because of the absence of jurisprudential uniformity, many international legal historians no
longer focus on theories of law to characterize different periods but examine each “period’s legal
consciousness, understood as the ensemble of categories, concepts, typical arguments,
argumentative techniques, and so forth, that characterize the work of [practitioners] and scholars
of that period.”105 Interestingly, many legal historians who adopt such a basis for periodization
still conclude that a rupture occurred during the nineteenth century; according to their position, it
occurred due to the rise of the modern international legal profession. 106 In this aspect, however,
the laws of war, including ICL, differ from other areas of international law. For centuries, this
body of law was enforced predominantly by a discrete military subculture,107 which moderated
the effect of nineteenth-century transformations (as well as earlier ones).108
The exact extent of penal enforcement of the laws of war (ICL) is unverifiable because the
relevant historical evidence is partial and usually in the form of brief secondary reports. 109 But,
the abundance of such reports leads many historians that examine military practices to conclude
that during the late Middle-Ages penal enforcement of the laws of war was non-negligible and at
least in some aspects “the laws of war in the Age of Chivalry are the direct ancestors of the
102
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Geneva Conventions.”110 Regarding subsequent periods, Parker explains, historical evidence
leads many historians to conclude:111
The rules of war followed by most European societies both at home and abroad have
thus displayed a remarkable continuity since the sixteenth century. This stems in part
from the relative stability of human nature--the advantages of cooperation and the
danger of total collapse were apparent to Renaissance soldiers as they are today--in part
from the lasting influence of the Bible, the Church Fathers and Roman Law on Western
Civilization. But both of these considerations received reinforcement from the weight of
practice and precedent--by frequent appeal to custom in assessing military conduct. It is
true that the theoretical restrictions of the jus in bello have multiplied; it is also true that
those restrictions have been breached at regular intervals. But almost every excess, from
the sixteenth century onward, has been subject by contemporaries to detailed scrutiny…
And if no excuses were available, moral condemnation and then legal sanctions ensued.
Most of the actions today outlawed by the Geneva Conventions have been condemned
in the West for at least four centuries; only the degree and the extent of enforcement has
changed over time.
And:112
[I]n most of the wars waged in Europe since the sixteenth century, breaches of the
norms for military conduct laid down in treatises… have been condemned and chastised
with increasing rigor. Individual soldiers faced trial and punishment by special military
tribunals for crimes committed against either fellow soldiers or civilians.
Furthermore, “modern armies (perhaps from as early as the late 18th century) shared a culture of
war that gave their formal wars an intercultural character even when the broader cultures were
different”.113 Hence, “many aspects of the eighteenth-century norm also survived the two world
wars of the twentieth century [and are currently shared] not only [by] those which have
eighteenth-century antecedents but also [by] more recent creations [that were] persuaded that
such patterns of behavior are the foundations of military culture… modern armies behave as
though they are bound by a common culture”.114
Thus, despite the undeniable elements of discontinuity (militaries, norms and jurisprudence
changed, the spatial applicability of the law varied, and enforcement levels fluctuated),
considerable continuity exists both in the content of the laws of war and in their social
acceptance and penal enforcement (ICL).
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The disparity between the aforementioned continuity findings and the prevalent rupture
depiction among international legal historians may also be resulting from another issue.
According to Lesaffer, “[o]ften international legal historians consider [jurisprudential writing] to
be convenient shorthand of what the international law of a certain period was”. 115 This is
problematic. Such sources are often biased and “[i]n most eras of history… practices and
customary law constituted a more important source for the law of nations”.116 Trying to
determine the continued existence of a legal system by examining jurisprudential writings may
also result, as hereinafter explained, in misdirected research.
No consensual definition exists for a “legal system.”117 Still, many believe that a legal
system exists, in the sociological sense, when the bulk of community members or officials have
come to accept, as a social convention, certain norms as obligatory.118 Such acceptance can exist
even when individuals disagree about the jurisprudential basis for their duty to abide by these
laws.119 Disagreements may also exist on whether specific norms are part of the system.120 Also,
often, the contours of the community are undefined and changing. 121 The normative force of a
legal system can, therefore, fluctuate across time, places, and issues.
Such normative force should be distinguished from adherence and enforcement because
even individuals who recognize a certain norm as binding may nevertheless decide not to follow
it.122 Admittedly, a legal system cannot exist over time if it continuously fails to have behavioral
effects. But occasional unpunished violations do not render it meaningless. Indeed, the core
“function of the legal system may be defined as producing and maintaining counter-factual
expectations in spite of disappointments.”123
This sociological definition of a legal system helps identify a dis-continuum in its history.
Considerable aspects of discontinuity are bound to be experienced by a legal system over time
in: (a) community contours; (b) the amount and identity of community-members or officials
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committed to its norms; (c) acceptance level and content of various norms; (d) members’
jurisprudential beliefs; and (e) obedience and enforcement levels. Nevertheless, a dis-continuum
should not be declared, as long as a social convention--generally regarding the system’s norms as
obligatory--persists among most community-members/officials.
This definition of a dis-continuum lends support to historians’ conclusion that evidence
regarding military practices indicates a centuries-long continuity in ICL history. International
jurists, however, impose additional conditions for acknowledging such continuity--holding preWWII cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war to be irrelevant to present-day ICL, for
presumably being: (a) rare (and thus insignificant); (b) domestic; and (3) bereft of a common
doctrine.124 The aforementioned abundant historical evidence refutes the rarity presumption. The
two other presumptions are refuted below.
Two brief clarifications are in order. First, this article exposes the continuous reliance of
ICL cases over the centuries on the international outlawry doctrine to refute the premise that past
cases lack a shared doctrine. There is no intent here to imply that other factors (such as political
interests) did not also influence the parties’ actions. Second, because of the pivotal role war
crime prosecutions played in ICL history, the terms “penal enforcement of the laws of war” and
“ICL” are often used interchangeably. Such use does not suggest that all other core international
crimes are post-WWII innovations; their pre-WWII history is addressed below.
4. Outlawry’s Origins
a. Germanic Law
Under Germanic law, individuals were deemed outlaws for wronging the entire community,
making it “the right… of every man… to hunt [them] down… and slay [them].”125 Outlaws were
not necessarily executed. Society was granted control over their lives and this perspective
gradually gave rise to additional forms of punishment, such as indefinite imprisonment and exile.
Individuals referred to as “banned”/“exiled”/“banished” were, from a legal perspective, outlaws
whose lives had been spared.126 This evolution of punishments, which occurred during the late
Middle-Ages, played a pivotal role in the development of criminal law: “many of the pure
punishments… have their root in outlawry.”127
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Originally, two forms of outlawry existed: “decreed” outlawry and outlawry of “manifest
criminality.” The former refers to actions requiring a semi-judicial decree after their commission,
declaring the perpetrators “outlaws.” This procedure was applied primarily to individuals who
had prevented the administration of justice.128 Manifest criminality refers to acts that instantly
reveal individuals’ “true” outlaw nature, allowing immediate execution without a prior decree
when such an outlaw is caught red-handed. Insidious stealing and killing (at night or using
poison), as well as arson, were regarded as exhibiting manifest criminality. 129 Few acts, however,
were considered as exhibiting manifest criminality; even robbery and diurnal murder were not
considered as such.130
Infractions that were not outlawry-deeming were considered wrongs inflicted strictly on the
victims and their kin, who alone could seek justice--mostly through “blood feud,” which was the
(bloody) equivalent of a civil suit.131 Although each side could harm any individual or property
belonging to the other side, “rather than complete destruction of the enemy, the goal of the feud
was to get the other party to accept the challenger’s view of what was right thus restoring the
peaceful state.”132 Hence, in contrast to the legal treatment of outlaws: (a) procedural regulations
governed conduct in feuds; (b) the wrongdoing was regarded as unverified; and (c) only the
victims and their kin were considered to have been (allegedly) wronged.133
Germanic jurisprudence described a social obligation as “peace” and many “peaces” existed.
“Personal” wrongs were regarded as breaches of the peace between the wrongdoers’ and the
victims’ kin, whereas outlaws were enemies/disturbers of the peace of the entire community.134
b. Roman Law
In Roman jurisprudence, the three main categories of law were the laws of nature, laws of
men, and customary laws. Some laws of men were regarded as universally applicable (jus
gentium or “law of nations”), as were some laws of nature.135
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Roman law also sanctioned extrajudicial execution of certain wrongdoers. For example, the
Romans believed that the laws of nature require rulers to act for the benefit of their public’s good
(commonwealth). The term “tyrant” was attached to a ruler who violated this duty, and Roman
law deemed tyrants “enemies of mankind,” to be killed by anyone. In fact, the phrase hostis
humani generis was first used in reference to tyrants, not pirates.136
The extrajudicial execution of violators of certain laws of nations was also permitted.
Notably, armed-forces operating within the boundaries of the Roman Empire that refused to
submit to Roman rule--i.e., brigands and pirates--were deemed enemies of all nations, executable
by anyone, for violating (according to the Romans) a law of nations that prohibited warring
without legitimate authorization.137 Somewhat similar legal treatment applied to “barbarians,”
external enemies considered “uncivilized” because they were beyond the pale of Roman
influence.138
Roman

legislation

also

permitted

the

extrajudicial

execution

of

“nocturnal”

thieves/murderers and regular soldiers who attacked civilians or pillaged without authorization,
by equating them to “latrones”, a term that became understood (by late-medieval times) as
referring to both brigands and robbers.139 This permission had limits. If the person’s identity or
wrongdoing were in doubt, certain summary proceedings had to be conducted before execution,
and extrajudicial execution was prohibited when judicial recourse was available.140
Roman law maintained two notions of treason, both of which allowed extrajudicial
execution. The first referred to treason committed against the Roman people, whose perpetrators
were “public enemies”. The second related to treason against the ruler (lèse-majesté).141
Roman law did not treat all wrongdoers whose extrajudicial execution it allowed as
regulated by a single doctrine.142 This began to change in the fourth century when Christianity
became the Empire’s official religion, causing Christian and Roman jurisprudence to gradually
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merge. Consequently (through a process that culminated only during the late Middle-Ages), the
status of the Church’s internal and external enemies (heretics and infidels) became equated with
that of the Empire’s enemies (pirates, brigands, rebels, traitors, and barbarians), and perpetrators
of other acts considered grave crimes by Christian or Roman law (e.g., robbers). All these
categories of wrongdoers were regarded equally as enemies of the Church, the Roman public,
and even mankind (to be killed by anyone).143
Despite some similarities between Roman-Christian and Germanic extrajudicial execution
doctrines, there were considerable differences. Notably, whereas Germanic law relied heavily on
self-enforcement, Roman-Christian jurisprudence considered it an exception.144 Formally,
Roman-Christian jurisprudence, generally regarded harming even enemies and criminals as a
grave crime and permitted doing so only when it was aimed at enforcing justice. Furthermore,
the enforcement of justice (namely, both war-making and the punishment of criminals) was the
prerogative of rulers (originally, Roman Emperors), because they were divinely chosen. Others
were primarily permitted to kill criminals and enemies under the direction of a ruler or God.
Gradually, the extrajudicial killings of criminals without such directions became permissible
only when recourse to the ruler’s courts was unavailable.145
c. The Medieval Jurisprudential Revolution
At the turn of the first millennium, different authorities competed to fill the power void
created by the decline of the Carolingian Empire.146 Despite Europe’s institutional
fragmentation, medieval jurisprudence adhered to a broad transnational concept of “public good”
rooted in Roman law, redefining the “Roman public” to include “all who obeyed the mother
church.”147

This

public

was

referred

to

as

republica

Christiana

and

even

as

“humanity”/“mankind”.148 In quest for dominance, the Church revived the Roman-Christian
doctrines that centuries earlier centralized war-making and criminal justice authorities in the
hands of divinely-chosen rulers--claiming dominance over all Christian rulers by asserting that
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the Pope inherited the Roman Emperors’ supreme authority to enforce justice and protect the
commonwealth of Christendom/humanity.149
Papal dominance was also propounded based on Germanic jurisprudence, mainly based on
the tenets of the Peace of God movement, which held that infringement of certain norms violated
a universal peace that supersedes all localized peaces.150 Such violations authorized the Church
to decree the religious version of outlawry: excommunication.151
Use of both Germanic and Roman-Christian doctrines caused these bodies of law to
gradually merge.152 Evidence of this conflation is found in the various terms, some RomanChristian in origin and others Germanic, that became synonymous with “outlaw,” including
“enemy of peace,” “disturber of peace,” “enemy of mankind,” “common criminal,” “banned,”
“exiled,” “banished” and “public enemy.”153
Several European rulers who, for historical reasons (e.g. being Charlemagne’s descendants),
had competing claims to the title of Emperor--notably, the head of the entity known as the “Holy
Roman Empire”--also advanced transnational jurisprudential positions similar to that taken by
Popes. But, each claimed that he--not the Pope (or anyone else)--was the true heir of Roman
imperial authority.154
The rise of modern States was a slow process that began in the late Middle-Ages, when
European Kings gradually centralized lawmaking and judicial powers in royal hands by
subordinating local lords and judicial systems, and freeing themselves from subordination to
Popes and “Emperors”.155 Ironically, these Kings, originally, made their bid for power and
autonomy based on the same doctrines as the Church, simply interpreting them differently: (a)
they declared that “every king is an emperor within his kingdom” and (b) reconstructed the
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Germanic communal peace notion into the “King’s peace” doctrine.156 Moreover, the
jurisprudence (originally advanced by the Church) that merged Roman-Christian and Germanic
law, by equating disturbances of the “Peace of God” with threats to the “Roman” (Christian)
“public good”, enabled Kings to apply Roman doctrines restricting extrajudicial executions so as
to limit the Germanic authorization of self-enforcement against outlaws and assert their courts’
exclusive authority to punish breaches of their subjects’ communal “peace”/“public good”. This
jurisprudence also enabled Kings to expand their courts’ substantive jurisdiction by adding to the
acts considered communal wrongs those prohibited under Roman-Christian jurisprudence, even
though not originally outlawry-deeming in Germanic law.157 The name given to the class of acts
criminalized based on this “expanded” outlawry jurisprudence was felonies; the prototypical
felonies were murder, robbery, theft, treason, arson, and rape.158
Royal consolidation of judicial powers was incomplete in the late Middle-Ages. Three types
of penal proceedings still existed: (a) general permission to extrajudicially execute the
perpetrator was authorized in certain cases of manifest criminality or when the perpetrator had
been decreed an outlaw; (b) semi-judicial, summary proceedings were conducted by local, nonjurist officials for some felons; and (c) full-fledged judicial proceedings were conducted by the
King’s judges for others.159
A similar enforcement structure existed in the military justice system for violators of the
laws of war (and other war-related international law): (a) enemy and compatriot soldiers caught
red-handed were often punished extrajudicially; (b) most other cases were handled by “courts
martial”/“military commissions” (semi-judicial, summary proceedings conducted by non-jurists);
and (c) some cases were tried by full-fledged judicial tribunals with expert judges.160
The correlation between that enforcement structure and the enforcement structure of
medieval domestic penal enforcement is compelling evidence of the outlawry origins of ICL,
given the accepted outlawry origins of domestic criminal law. One of the types of penal
proceedings used (commonly) to enforce the laws of war, extrajudicial executions, is in itself
156
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strongly indicative of the outlawry pedigree, given outlawry’s original implication (permission to
extrajudicially execute perpetrators). Indeed, the connection between ICL and the medieval
outlawry doctrine was still recognized in the early twentieth century. 161 Only sometime after
WWII was this connection completely forgotten, and past summary executions of war criminals
inaccurately interpreted as acts of vengeance or reprisal, not the enforcement of criminal
justice.162 Even if occasionally abused, a legal authority to summarily execute war criminals was
invoked throughout the centuries. Furthermore, it was utilized against both enemy and
compatriot soldiers, which supports the conclusion that it was not mere vengeance or reprisal.163
In the context of domestic legal history, the outlawry doctrine’s normative power has also
been questioned by claims that outlawry is not a juridical concept. Agamben argues that the
outlawry-based prerogative to place a person beyond the pale of the law is still embedded in
State sovereignty, in the mechanisms that grant the State control over individuals’ lives.
Agamben claims that acknowledging that persistent embedding reveals the falsehood of the
belief that the law can constrain those in power.164 Butler agrees with Agamben regarding the
inaptitude of law, but criticizes him for making overly general claims about the persistent use of
outlawry by those in power, which “do not yet tell us how this power functions differently” in
different times and contexts.165
If Agamben’s position is applicable to ICL, we must conclude that ICL’s outlawry doctrine
has always been a mere disguise for oppression. If Butler’s position is true, a genealogical
account of that doctrine is uninteresting. But, as many have noted, Agamben’s and Butler’s
positions are based on inaccurate understanding of the law.166 Laws can constrain the use of
power.167
It should be noted that a common response to claims that outlawry was not a juridical
concept underestimates outlawry’s contribution to criminal law. In most Western domestic legal
systems, over time, outlawry drastically changed and subsequently faded. This is especially true
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for outlawry decreeing, after that authority passed from royal to judicial hands. Therefore, it has
been argued that, with the exception of the name, the original outlawry and the later, judicial
outlawry are patently distinct, and whereas the former was not a juridical concept the latter
was,168 which means that the elements of discontinuity overshadow those of continuity.169
But, the claim that the original outlawry doctrine was not a juridical concept is actually an
expression of the flawed “Modern State Conception,” which disregards the means used by
criminal justice systems that lack centralized law-enforcement organs. Also, in most domestic
systems, outlawry changed gradually, making rupture claims inaccurate. 170 More importantly,
this reasoning fails to acknowledge outlawry’s full influence on domestic criminal law. As noted,
the original basis for the penalization of felonies was their perception as grave wrongs, whose
perpetrators were outlaws. That legal perception had various long-lasting effects (one of them is
discussed in the next section).
The elements of continuity in ICL regarding outlawry are even greater. Unlike its (generally
speaking) long-abolished domestic counterpart,171 the outlawry-based authority to extrajudicially
execute war criminals remained part of the law until 1949.172 Moreover, even today, considering
wrongdoers enemies of mankind constitutes the conceptual basis for universal jurisdiction.173
d. Military Justice as a Transnational System
We intuitively assume that States and their laws (criminal and otherwise) came first,
followed by international law that was developed by the States as a means of coordinating their
interactions and moreover, ICL was created only very recently. Yet this description is inaccurate.
Kings originally relied on the same transnational doctrines as did Popes and “Emperors” and
although a localized notion of public/peace began to emerge already during medieval times, the
process that detached it from its transnational origins was extremely drawn-out.174 As late as the
nineteenth century, in most European domestic criminal justice systems the prevailing
168
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jurisprudential basis for the criminalization of many felonies classified today as domestic (e.g.,
murder, robbery, arson, theft, and rape) continued to be perceived as infringement of universal
natural law. “[C]ase law and especially doctrine [had thus remained] of an international
character.”175 Such felonies were deemed “crime[s]… contra jus gentium… against the law of
nations”,176 and their perpetrators “enemies of mankind.”177 Many but not all European judicial
systems even applied the universal jurisdiction doctrine to such felonies. 178 Moreover, in judicial
systems that did not apply that doctrine (e.g., English Common law) the perception of such
felonies as violations of universal law also remained. Their courts were simply perceived as
having jurisdiction only when the universal natural law was violated in a manner that breached
the relevant King’s “peace”.179
Domestic crimes--namely, acts considered crimes only in a specific kingdom--existed
alongside universal crimes.180 The distinction between the two was not always clear, as certain
domestic crimes came into existence through a local interpretation of a universal crime.181
Only in the nineteenth century, under the influence of positivism, support for the application
of universal jurisdiction to felonies diminished considerably.182 In some countries it transformed
into the judex loci deprehensionis doctrine, which permits the prosecution of certain foreigndomestic criminals.183
Currently, many jurists characterize pre-WWII cases of war crime prosecution as purely
domestic legal measures, and therefore not ICL precedent, because they were adjudicated by the
military tribunals of various European powers and not by transnational tribunals.184 This position
is mistaken because, as explained, in the past “there was no sharp distinction between
international and national law”.185
This position is further mistaken because until the nineteenth century military and civilian
justice systems were not branches of a single (domestic) system, and military justice had
175
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considerable transnational attributes. In medieval times, knightly issues, including the laws of
war, were outside the jurisdiction of royal civilian courts and were adjudicated by a separate
judicial system. Other guild-oriented transnational judicial system also existed.186 Members of
the knightly guild considered themselves defenders of all “Romans” (Christians),187 and “[t]he
law of arms was [regarded as an] extension of the natural law and the law of nations.”188 When it
came to enforcing such laws, all medieval military judicial forums regarded themselves as
belonging to a single transnational network aimed at regulating a given social sphere (war),
monopolized by a specific transnational guild (knights). Thus, the same law was “applied and
enforced by all military tribunals in Christendom, whether of the enemy prince or of the prince
upon whom a knight or man-at-arms depended.”189 That transnational soldierly ethos persisted
far beyond the Middle-Ages.190 Therefore, legal doctrines adjudicated in military forums were
even less susceptible to “domestication” pressures than those adjudicated in civilian courts.191
Because the same transnational doctrines were applied in military forums of various armies,
individuals were often tried for infringing norms not enshrined in any formal domestic
legislation.192 The current understanding of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, after all,
was adopted by domestic law only in the nineteenth century as part of a positivism-driven
codification trend that swept across Europe.193 ICL, which was not influenced as much as
domestic penal law by nineteenth century positivism, never fully accepted this principle.194
Admittedly, the codification trend did have some influence on ICL, contributing to the treaty
codification of the laws of war. Some contemporary jurists even posit that the “rules of war
became laws of war” only following that treaty codification, as gradually, penalties were
explicitly assigned in such treaties to violations of codified norms.195 But this is inaccurate. In
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the past, the terms “rules of war” and “laws of war” were often used interchangeably. 196
Moreover, these norms were not mere professional rules of ethics before their codification, just
as the prohibitions against rape and theft are not merely ethical recommendations in
contemporary Scotland because they are unlegislated crimes. As discussed, most laws of war
were considerably enforced against both enemy and compatriot soldiers (with the maximum
penalty being death). The misleading depiction of the uncodified laws of war as ineffective can
be traced back to attempts by some nineteenth-century positivists to undermine these laws.197
Military tribunals always had a mixed domestic-transnational function. Their chief
“municipal” role was to enforce norms currently considered domestic military law (e.g.,
disobeying an order). These norms were often enshrined in positive military legislation known as
“Articles of War,” which also included provisions forbidding compatriot soldiers from
committing certain acts barred under the laws of war.198 But even such positive war crime
prohibitions should not be viewed as entirely domestic legal norms. First, until the nineteenth
century, European military penal codes were usually not acts of parliament, but rather executive
decrees issued by Kings or military commanders based on an inherent prerogative. That
prerogative was originally anchored in the convention that Kings and commanders were not only
domestic agents but also high-ranking members of the transnational guild of warriors--dutybound, as such, to enforce international law and maintain their forces’ discipline.199 Second, prenineteenth-century European jurisprudence commonly viewed unwritten natural law as
obligatory. Domestic legislations were generally expected to reflect that law and they were often
considered written clarifications of it.200 Third, for centuries, even when a certain war crime was
not explicitly noted in the Articles of War, soldiers could still be punished for violating the
unlegislated, transnational laws of war.201 As the 1643 Scottish Articles of War stated,
“[m]atters, that are clear by the light and law of nature, are presupposed… other things may be
judged by the common customs and constitutions of war; or may, upon new emergents, be
expressed afterward.”202
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During the nineteenth century, many European States began to rely on conscription-based
national armies, which weakened combatants’ commitment to the transnational soldierly
ethos.203 Legislative reforms further increased military courts’ subordination to domestic/civilian
legislative and judicial bodies.204 But even through this period, ICL considerably resisted
domestication pressures.205
The gradual rise of modern States and the transnational nature of military justice are
illustrated below in two contexts: the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms, and England.
e. When Did the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms Become States?
Until recently, the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War, was
commonly viewed as the inception of the modern State, mainly because as a result of it the
princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire--the predecessors of most European States--attained
autonomy over the key functions associated with sovereignty: law-, war-, and peace-making.206
International law’s birth presumably followed: “The idea of authority or organization above the
states [was] no longer [and the] new system reste[d] on international law… operating between,
rather than above states.”207 Note that this narrative undermines international law by depicting it
as a more recent creation than States which does not supersede State authority and was only
created by the States to aid in coordinating their interactions.
This Westphalian narrative has been refuted in recent decades.208 The rise of modern
States in Europe was a gradual process that began in the late Middle-Ages and peaked only
during the nineteenth century. The lengthiness of this process is evident in the context of the
Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms. Although these princedoms were considerably autonomous
already centuries before 1648, the Peace of Westphalia significantly constrained their
sovereignty, imposing restrictions that remained in force until the Empire’s abolishment in 1806.
According to these restrictions, in exercising their law-, war-, and peace-making powers, the
princedoms were prohibited from infringing various transnational legal norms, including certain
unwritten norms considered universal natural law.209 Two imperial tribunals, the Imperial
Chamber Court and the Aulic Council, were further authorized to void laws, domestic court
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decisions, treaties signed by princedoms, and other government actions of the princedoms if they
violated these transnational norms.210 As the princedoms gained sovereign powers, the Empire’s
“structure transformed… into a relationship of international law”,211 which gradually
transformed these tribunals into “international court[s]”.212 Thus, contrary to the “Westphalian
Myth”, even after 1648, and until the nineteenth century, both transnational organs and
international law remained above these emerging States.
As exposed in recent decades, the Westphalian Myth was created in the nineteenth century
and there is considerable convergence between central catalysts of it and some catalysts of
modern positivism. First, a jurisprudential turn to the social sciences contributed to the rise of
both. Gradually, the claim of secular natural law jurisprudence to rationalize jurisprudential
thinking by drawing analogies from the natural sciences and logical reasoning lost its appeal.
Instead, much of jurisprudential thinking turned to attempting to draw analogies from the social
sciences. Positivism was amongst the most prominent of these attempts.213 Also as part of this
transition, many turned to “what amounted to some kind of historical sociology”, which gave rise
to the Westphalian Myth.214 Second, both legal positivism and the Westphalian Myth did not
merely reflect the culmination of modern States’ rise; these views were considerably advanced
by those attempting to strengthen State sovereignty.215 Positivists, accordingly, were among
those that strongly contributed to the propagation of the Westphalian Myth. While positivist
conceptualizations of States and of international law were “doctrinally consolidated [only] in the
final decades of the nineteenth century”,216 soon thereafter, with the aid of the Westphalian
Myth, such conceptualizations were “projected back as the screen memory over an otherwise
forgotten past.”217 The Westphalian Myth was especially advanced by positivist opponents of
international law. Some such opponents eventually broke off from international jurists to create a
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new discipline: International Relations.218 That discipline was premised, originally, on the belief
that power and politics, not law, regulate behavior at the international level. It was also premised
on the Westphalian Myth, holding that a world order consisting of fully autonomous States is a
longstanding social contract.219
International law is, sometimes, said to have been born not subsequent to the Westphalian
inception of Sates, but as a result of Hugo Grotius’s jurisprudence, written during the Thirty
Years’ War. This is false. Continuity exists between Grotius’s work and earlier jurisprudence. 220
This narrative also has its origin in the nineteenth century, as a person-oriented version of the
Westphalian Myth.221
f. England
The English Kings were among the first rulers to free themselves from papal and imperial
rule. Furthermore, already around the twelfth century, England started developing a distinct
domestic legal system: the Common Law.222 But, for many centuries the Common Law was not
the only legal system in England, and it vied for jurisdiction and predominance with other
systems such as the military, admiralty, and equity systems. Unlike Common Law courts, most
competing judicial systems adjudicated cases mainly based on the norms considered universal,
natural law across Europe.223
Because prohibitions in military and civilian European legal systems shared their
jurisprudential origin, it was common to find two different crimes--transnational (adjudicated in
military courts, English military courts included) versus domestic (adjudicated in civilian courts,
such as the Common Law courts)--bearing the same name.224 For example, as demonstrated
below, two different crimes of treason existed.
Today treason is considered the archetypical domestic crime, which should never fall under
the jurisdiction of ICL.225 In the late Middle-Ages and later, however, because Christian Kings
were believed to be divinely-anointed, “rebellion [was] a breach of the faith that held Christian
218
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society together [and rebels were, accordingly, viewed as having] placed themselves beyond the
pale of peaceful Christian society and were now no more than brigands and thieves.”226 Put
differently, treason was an international crime and traitors/rebels international outlaws.
Although Kings benefited from this transnational doctrine, they preferred to vest much of
the authority to adjudicate treason against them in their civilian (domestic) courts. Consequently,
for centuries, the military and civilian systems had parallel authority to try combat-related
treason.227 Gradually, the (transnational) military and (domestic) civilian crimes of treason
became distinct, as illustrated by the case of Perkin Warbeck (1499). Warbeck, a Fleming,
invaded England, laying claim to the English throne by pretending to be the son of Edward IV.
After failing, he was prosecuted for treason in a Common Law court, which ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction because enemy aliens acting in the course of war were not bound to uphold the
King’s peace. Warbeck was then retried by a military tribunal, which convicted him of treason
(by many accounts) and sentenced him to death. The military tribunal’s jurisdiction and ruling
was, most likely, based on a contemporaneous law of war that deemed usurpation to be a
tyrannical, traitorous act.228 Other medieval cases reveal that, unlike domestic courts, military
tribunals prosecuted even foreigners for certain wartime acts of betrayal of allegiance (treason)
owed to their (foreign) King.229 Thus, the jurisprudence of military justice diverged considerably
from domestic jurisprudence.
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Perkin Warbeck230

According to eighteenth-century historian John Barrow, when Warbeck was (prior to his
capture) under Archduke Philip’s protection, the English King sent ambassadors to the
Archduke “and demanded that Perkin might be delivered into their hands as a pirate, or
common enemy to mankind, who ought not be protected by the law of nations.”231
The military and other legal systems continued to exist in England long after the MiddleAges. Only in the seventeenth century did Common Law jurists effectively try to abolish the
competing systems, with partial success.232 Many systems, including the military system,
however, survived. They remained relatively autonomous well into the nineteenth century, when,
owing to a cultural trend that led to the eventual merger of Common Law and Equity, Common
Law doctrines began to enjoy broad application in the courts of the other systems.233
Reliance on the unwritten laws of war for trying both compatriot and captured enemy
soldiers continued even later, and regarding the latter it remained the main legal basis for
prosecutions of war crimes even after WWII. These unlegislated norms and the military tribunals
that apply them still regulate some war crimes cases in England regarding both kinds of
soldiers,234 and, even today, these military tribunals stand “wholly outside the [English] civilian
230
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court system, in the same way that the regular courts-martial… stand outside it; and the law they
appl[y] [is] not English law but… the customary international laws of war, as a sui generis
applicable law.”235
In sum, as both the cases of England and the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms
demonstrate, it is a mistake to assume that States predated or created international law. State
sovereignty is the result of a protracted process that has peaked only in recent times.
Additionally, the military and civilian justice systems have distinct institutional and normative
histories, and throughout the centuries, reliance on transnational jurisprudence persisted more
strongly in the military justice forums. For these reasons, pre-WWII war crime prosecution cases
should rightfully be regarded as precedents of ICL.
5. The Outlawry Basis of ICL
a. Medieval ICL
Medieval jus ad bellum divided armed-conflicts into several categories that mirrored those
of contemporaneous criminal law. The two primary categories were feud-like wars and wars
intended to punish enemies deemed international outlaws by jus ad bellum.236
The law applicable in wars waged against outlawed enemies conceptually mimicked the
municipal process of punishing outlaws: the unjust nature of the enemies’ actions was
predetermined, and because the wrong was against universal peace (the commonwealth of
Christendom/mankind/humanity) all were duty-bound to join in the war and punish the
international outlaws. “Total War” could be waged against outlawed enemies (no jus in bello
restrictions applied). Therefore, all captured enemy combatants--not only war criminals--could
be executed.237
Influenced by Roman-Christian jurisprudence, medieval jus ad bellum considered the
following belligerents to be outlawed enemies: pirates, brigands, rebels, traitors, tyrants,
barbarians/savages, infidels, and heretics.238 Otherwise-legitimate belligerents (Christian rulers)
fighting without just cause were also outlawed enemies.239 Based on the last category,
contemporary jurists presume that each side generally declared the other to lack just cause, so
that all medieval wars were fought without jus in bello restrictions and therefore cases in which
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individuals were held personally responsible for violating jus in bello (i.e., war crime
prosecutions) were rare.240 Many historians, however, consider this an exaggeration, because
“war to the death [between Christian rulers] was uncommon.”241
Wars between Christian rulers were mostly limited conflicts, equivalent to large-scale blood
feuds. Similarly to feuds, (a) opponents were considered the enemies of only a given community;
(b) the identity of the wrongdoer was to be determined by the war; and (c) in bello conduct was
subject to legal restrictions (including a duty to grant POW status to captured enemy knights).242
As demonstrated below, otherwise-legitimate combatants who violated jus in bello in feud-like
wars were individually considered international outlaws.
The shaping of medieval ICL was influenced by the aforementioned Roman-Christian
doctrine which permitted harming even enemies and criminals only for the enforcement of
justice, and granted rulers the primary justice enforcement authority. Based on this doctrine, acts
generally considered outlawry-deeming, such as harming lives or property, were considered legal
when committed by rulers or combatants acting under their authority during feud-like wars.243
But because the wartime legality of such acts depended on royal authorization, committing them
without such license remained outlawry-deeming; as Jamieson explains:244
serious persistent crimes could result in an individual being branded as an outlaw.
Offences of murder… arson and theft were regarded as heinous crimes which would put
a person beyond the laws of society [However,] soldiers were given, in effect, a license
to commit them… provided they fought with the sanctions of an appropriate authority.
Problems arose when that authority was absent and soldiers were seen to be fighting
illegitimately for their own interests. In such a situation… [t]hey could find themselves
treated as outlaws, against whom lethal force could be legitimately used by those in
authority.
War criminals were often referred to as “robbers,” “murderers,” “arsonists” etcetera.245
These were not references to domestic crimes, as evident by the fact that the combatants who
committed them were “regarded as criminals… who were beyond the normal laws of God and
men” (i.e., as international outlaws for violating international law). 246 These references were,
most likely, a way to convey these combatants’ international outlaw status, alternate to referring
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to them as “outlaws”. After all, the prohibitions against harming property and lives (felonies such
as arson, robbery, murder) were outlawry-deeming natural laws to which the permission given to
combatants to take lives and property by royal authorization was a legal exception.
The view of regular combatants who violated the laws of war as international outlaws is also
evident in the practice of equating such war criminals with pirates and brigands. Sohmer-Tai
uncovered hundreds of cases that were adjudicated in various courts around the Mediterranean
between approximately 1200 and 1410, in which soldiers of conventional navy forces were
accused “of robbing… in modo piratico (in a piratical fashion or manner) despite conditions of…
pre-existing treaty, or alliance.”247 Similarly, Rowe reported that in 1431, during a war in France,
a captured (otherwise-legitimate) enemy combatant was executed for violating the laws of war,
and his captor was paid “as though he had caught a brigand”.248
The prohibition against deceitful taking of life/property (originating from both Germanic
and Roman-Christian law) was also adapted to feud-like wars, serving as the basis for various in
bello laws. The main wartime acts criminalized under this prohibition were breaches of
obligations toward an enemy, including violations of truce/peace agreements, terms of surrender,
and POW parole conditions.249
Although medieval sources are secondary and brief, they nonetheless contain reports
explicitly referring to perpetrators of such acts as outlaws. A twelfth century chronicle of a case
from 1098 describes how enemy knights captured as POWs by King Rufus of England were
granted, upon their request, parole every evening. In response to his courtiers’ concerns that the
prisoners might escape, Rufus answered: “Far be it from me to think that a brave knight will
forfeit his word! If he did so, he would become a contemptible outlaw all his life.”250
Cases related to the assassination, in 1419, of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, also
prove that perfidious violations of the laws of war were outlawry-deeming. During Charles VI’s
reign in France, a baron war erupted between his son (the Dauphin) and John the Fearless. The
Dauphin requested a meeting with John to negotiate a truce, but at the meeting he and his men

247

Emily Sohmer-Tai, “Marking Water: Piracy and Property in the Pre-Modern West” (paper presented at
Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges, Feb. 12-15, 2003).
248
B.J.H. Rowe, “John Duke of Bedford and the Norman ‘Brigands’,” English History Review 47 (1932): 596
(noting that war crime prosecution was rare during that war).
249
Whetham, Just Wars, 4, 17-18, 45, 66; Keen, Laws, 51-59, 96-100, 130-31, 162-173.
250
Ordericus Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of England, trans. T. Forester (1853), 3:233 (c. 1075-1143).
40

-DRAFT-

assassinated John, violating safe-conduct assurances he had given John.251 This assassination (an
act considered a war crime to this day252) was explicitly described at the time as an act
“against… the law of nations” (“contra… jus gentium”),253 and its perpetrators were declared
“disturbers of the peace” (“les infracteurs de la paix”) and “enemies of the peace” (“des ennemis
de la paix”).254 Charles even disowned his son and signed a treaty with Henry V, King of
England (a supporter of the Duke of Burgundy), whereby the French throne would pass to Henry
after his death.255 Although the Dauphin escaped further punishment, many of his accessories
were sentenced to death, some by a French military tribunal and others by King Henry. 256
Because the crime was committed before Henry’s active involvement in the war and because
Henry punished perpetrators when Charles ruled France, these cases can be seen as early
instances of reliance on universal jurisdiction in prosecuting war crimes.257
The Assassination of John the Fearless258

Similarly to how a Latin chronicle referred to the act as “contra fidem & jus
gentium”(“against the faith and the law of nations”), an English chronicler called it a
murder in violation of a promise and “against both God’s lawes and man’s lawes.”259
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Occasionally, perfidious violations of the laws of war were referred to as treason. 260 That is
because the international crime of treason was much broader than its contemporary domestic
successor: in addition to betrayal of one’s sovereign, violations of many other obligations and
acts of deceitful taking of life or property were also considered treason. All these forms of
treason were regarded as outlawry-deeming violations of universal, natural law.261 Hence, such
treason references were probably intended to convey the perpetrators’ outlaw status. Some of
these acts are still described as “treacherous” in modern ICL.262
Attempts were also made to incorporate non-combatant protections into medieval jus in
bello. Although not all non-combatants were legally protected, pillage, rape, and harming of
women, children, the elderly, priests, churches, and members of several professions were
considered violations of universal, natural law.263 We find reliance on the international outlawry
doctrine to this end in the “Truce of God” decreed by Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, in 1085.
In addition to placing those fighting during certain religious dates under a ban as “violators of the
holy peace” (deeming them outlaws), Henry decreed that: “Merchants… rustics… other similar
occupations… [w]omen… and all those ordained to sacred orders, shall enjoy continual peace”
(namely, harming them was always outlawry-deeming).264
Similarly, Canon 27 of the Third Lateran Council (1179), excommunicated (outlawed)
members of six mercenary forces because they: “practice[d] such cruelty upon Christians that
they respect[ed] neither churches nor monasteries, and spare[d] neither widows, orphans, old or
young nor any age or sex.”265 These mercenaries were internationally outlawed, as the Canon
called “on all the faithful [to] oppose [them] with all their might and by arms protect the
Christian people against them.”266
Some claim that these medieval non-combatant protections were not enforced because
knights, who generally practiced and enforced the laws of war, cared only about themselves.267
This is an exaggeration.268 A knight could be stripped of his honors (chivalry’s unique
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expression of outlawry) for the “sacking of churches… rape [or] arson”, because these were
“breaches of the knightly faith”.269 As the cases of Conradin and von-Hagenbach demonstrate,
even some high-ranking knights were actually punished by their adversaries for violating noncombatant protections. Some lower-ranking knights are known to have been punished even by
their own side for violating these prohibitions.270 Furthermore, certain non-combatant protections
were more adhered to than others; particularly, the law protecting priests 271 and women.272 Noncombatant legal protections were even more strictly enforced against non-knightly soldiers.273
The “tyranny” doctrine was also used to protect civilians. In Roman law, sovereigns who
violated their duty to act for the “public good” were deemed tyrants. Because all Christians were
regarded as belonging to the Roman public, in the late Middle-Ages and centuries thereafter a
ruler could be deemed a tyrant for acting against the commonwealth of his subjects or of foreign
Christians.274 Four main subcategories of tyrants existed: (a) rulers who committed atrocities
against their subjects; (b) rulers who conducted aggressive wars, in which extensive atrocities
were committed against Christians; (c) rulers who systematically failed to punish their subjects
who committed atrocities against compatriot or foreign Christians; and (d) individuals who
usurped a throne (because God determines such entitlements).275
The tyranny doctrine was originally an ad bellum law, allowing total war to be waged
against all those on the tyrant’s side.276 But, despite the original permission to kill not only the
tyrant, this doctrine is strongly related to ICL history. Since medieval thought shifted with great
ease from individual culpability to collective responsibility and vice versa, the tyranny doctrine
regulated not only interactions between collective entities, but was also a penal norm that treated
the relevant individual ruler and his close associates as international outlaws.

This is

demonstrated by the prosecution of von-Hagenbach for tyranny and of King Conradin, along
with a few of his men, for usurpation (a subcategory of tyranny). Gradually, the doctrine’s ICL
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element became increasingly pronounced: the masses were no longer executed and only culpable
high-ranking individuals, including rulers, were prosecuted for tyranny.277
Since tyranny authorized deposing the ruler, when a King was accused of tyranny, the
accusation was usually made by those wishing to depose him.278 Tyranny was also commonly
used by rulers to justify intervention in foreign conflicts.279 These two politically motivated
applications are neither surprising (as tyranny was an ad bellum law), nor should they lead us to
disregard the tyranny doctrine (because even ad bellum laws often have normative force).280
Especially noteworthy is the application of tyranny in the context of baron wars. Kings held
that only rulers not subservient to other rulers were authorized to wage war, but local lords
claimed to have autonomous authority to make war. During much of late-medieval times, a legal
compromise was reached that permitted baron wars, but with uniquely restrictive jus in bello.
Notably, causing extensive harm to non-combatants was a war crime in such wars.281 Local lords
who violated that jus in bello were considered tyrants (and murderers, outlaws, etc.).
The case of Thomas of Marle (1111-14), which occurred during King Louis VI’s reign in
France, demonstrates this issue. The chronicler Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis (1081-1151) accused
Thomas of “ferocious tyranny” for unjustly warring with neighboring lords.282 After King Louis
intervened, Thomas promised to cease fighting but reneged on his promise and committed acts of
massacre, rapine, and arson, “not [even] spar[ing] the clergy out of fear of excommunication nor
the people out of any humanity.”283 In response, Church leaders condemned him as an “enem[y]
of Christ’s true bride,” and “struck at Thomas’s tyranny [by] strip[ping] him of all honours as an
infamous criminal, enemy to the name of Christian.”284 The King then285
gathered an army against Thomas [and] turned towards… castle of Crécy … seized [it and]
confounded the criminals; piously massacred the impious and mercilessly beheaded those
who had showed no mercy… the king then set out against [the] wicked castle [of
Nouvions] in pardoning the innocent and severely punishing the guilty… Thirsting for
justice, he condemned all the detestable murderers he found to be hanged [and] abolished
in perpetuity the lordship of that infamous Thomas and his heirs over that city.
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The Execution of Thomas of Marle286

The transition from medieval to Early Modern Times is marked by royal triumph in the
debate concerning the illegality of baron wars. Participants in such wars were henceforth
considered rebels/traitors/brigands.287 At about the same time, various prohibitions that first
applied only to baron wars became applicable to wars between sovereigns.288
b. Early Modern Times (Approximately 1500-1799)
When contemporary jurists outline ICL history, cases from Early Modern Times of penal
enforcement of the laws of war are hardly ever acknowledged (unlike medieval and nineteenthcentury cases, of which, at least a few are mentioned and only then dismissed as unrelated to
contemporary ICL).289 But historians uncovered many such cases from Early Modern Times.290
The discrepancy is caused by two misconceptions.
First, many sixteenth and seventeenth century wars were either conflicts between Catholics
and Protestants (who considered each other heretics) or rebellions, and jus ad bellum still
permitted waging total war against heretics and rebels. Therefore, jurists assume that wartime
conduct was not legally regulated. The most horrific of these conflicts was the Thirty Years’ War
(1618-1648). Its trauma is credited for motivating Grotius (and subsequent jurists) to develop
doctrines mandating belligerents to abide by jus in bello regardless of their views about their
286
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opponent’s cause. Thus, jus in bello is considered to be predominantly a post-1648
development.291
Second, in the second half of Early Modern Times, most conflicts were interstate wars in
which a total war policy was generally prohibited. Still, jurists do not consider war crime
prosecution cases from these wars as precedents of ICL, but purely domestic measures--each
taken by the State whose military tribunal adjudicated it--because there is “difficulty in
grounding an international criminal law in a decentralized legal order.”292
This account is incorrect. Indeed, many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century conflicts were
religious wars and rebellions in which, during the initial period of conflict, at least one side
adopted a total war approach, usually reciprocated by the adversary. Counter-intuitively,
however, the adversary’s total war reprisal often did not precipitate the war into unrestrained
bloodshed. The harm suffered by the first side from such reprisal often caused it to renounce its
total war approach, and both sides would agree to conduct themselves as-if they considered the
other side a legitimate belligerent. This meant that the sides obligated themselves to adhere to jus
in bello, to punish violators of these laws, and to accord POW status to captured enemy soldiers
who had not committed such violations. Although many wartime atrocities went unpunished
during these times, there was far more ICL enforcement than the no-enforcement jurists
assume.293
Depiction of late-seventeenth and eighteenth century cases of war crime prosecution as
merely domestic measures is also inaccurate. First, as explained, the conclusion that a legal
system did not exist only because it relied on a decentralized enforcement mechanism is based
on an overly-narrow and historically incomplete conception of legal systems. Second, the various
European military judicial forums continued to regard themselves as part of a single
transnational network, obligated to uphold the international laws of war.294 Third, during this
period pirates were also punished mainly by the military tribunals of European forces, and still,
jurists acknowledge that piracy was already an international crime at the time because of the
application of a similar transnational doctrine in all piracy cases. The same reasoning should
apply also to war crime prosecutions.
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Based on the aforementioned misconceptions, the narrative of the history of the laws of war
prevalent among contemporary jurists is that: (a) before the second half of Early Modern Times
there was no effective international law regulating wartime conduct and (b) although such a body
of law did subsequently exist, it addressed only States and not individuals until the end of
WWII.295 This account is simply the application of the Westphalian Myth to the laws of war.
Historians, by contrast, have shown that the laws of war existed throughout the period, and
although they were occasionally violated, “legal sanctions [often] ensued” in the form of “trial
and punishment by special military tribunals” (scilicet, ICL also existed).296 Thus, current ICL
proponents unknowingly support an inaccurate narrative, originally commonly propagated to
delegitimize international law, although a more accurate account serves their cause better.
Jurists’ historical account of public international law in general also divides Early Modern
Times in half, although, the declared guiding rationale here usually has to do with jurisprudential
shifts. First, the transition from the Middle-Ages to Early Modern Times is said to be marked by
the triumph of the “Divine Right of Kings” jurisprudence, which proclaimed Kings to be
superior princes, unsubordinated to anyone, who alone have authority to make war and punish
criminals. A second transition allegedly began with Grotius’s jurisprudence. That transition
gradually changed the presumed foundation of the duty to abide by international law, from a
belief in its divineness to a secular belief that natural law can be deduced through logical
reasoning. This secular perspective induced the premise that certain natural laws, including core
human rights, existed even in a “state of nature,” before the formation of a social-contract-based
society. Because belligerents are in a state of nature in relation to one another, they must abide
by these natural laws.297
This is, however, an oversimplified account. First, early social-contract jurisprudence
existed, and was influential, already in the sixteenth century,298 and divine-right jurisprudence
still had support in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century.299 Second, each of these two
schools included scholars both dismissive and supportive of international law. 300 Third, many
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more schools existed throughout Early Modern Times, a plurality resulting from the
Reformation, which shattered earlier jurisprudential consensus.301
The lack of consensus further caused jurisprudential writings to lose much of their authority.
Although they still exercised some influence (divine-right jurisprudence aided Kings to triumph
in the struggle over sovereign power and social-contract jurisprudence contributed to
international law’s secularization), customary law and practices were more important legal
sources. As a result, actual international law exhibited greater continuity than is conveyed by
early-modern jurisprudential works.302 Accordingly, although armies, wars, and jurisprudence
experienced considerable changes during these centuries, the laws of war and their penal
enforcement “displayed a remarkable continuity [due to, among other reasons] the weight [of]
practice and precedent”.303 Therefore, the current tendency in jurists’ historical accounts to
divide Early Modern Times is inaccurate and is probably a lingering effect of the Westphalian
Myth. The remainder of this part examines cases from various early-modern wars, to
demonstrate that despite considerable jurisprudential and societal changes, ICL continued to be
enforced and its doctrinal reliance on the international outlawry doctrine persisted.
1)

The French Wars of Religion (1562-1598)

In addition to the period’s religious wars, jurists also consider the “end of chivalry” as a
cause for discontinuity between medieval and early-modern laws of war, because the community
to which the laws of war applied changed to mercenaries that presumably disregard these
laws.304 The French Wars of Religion were civil wars between Catholics and Protestants in
which all sides relied on mercenaries. Therefore, had the Reformation or the end of chivalry
caused a discontinuity in the laws of war, conduct during these wars would have exhibited that
rupture.305 This is not the case.
Penal enforcement of jus in bello during these religious civil wars is illustrated in a case
described in the autobiography of Marshal Blaise de-Monluc, who served in the French military
from 1521 to 1574. After a victory near a certain town, two commissioners (military judges)
were appointed, but additional commissioners soon had to be assigned because the first two
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“execute[d] Justice upon the Catholics only”.306 Meanwhile, Monluc arrived in town and after
failing to convince the commissioners to punish two prisoners, despite strong evidence that they
committed infinite “Rapines and Violations,” he directly ordered these prisoners’ hanging.307 For
such actions, Monluc was described by some as an unbiased commander who “hung disturbers
of the peace from either side.”308
The transition from knight-led to mercenary forces also did not result in complete disregard
of the laws of war, among other reasons, because it was gradual.309 French noblemen,
accordingly “continued to exhibit chivalric courtesy on the battlefield during both the Wars of
Religion and the Thirty Years’ War.”310 Moreover, describing early-modern mercenaries as
lacking commitment to the laws of war is an exaggeration. Mercenaries generally upheld POWrelated prohibitions.311 This signifies an important legal development. Originally only knights
were eligible for POW status, and other captured enemy combatants could be executed even
without committing a crime. Only in Early Modern Times was eligibility for POW status
expanded.312 Thus, the transformation that armies experienced caused “[t]he knightly practices of
warfare… to spread out and bec[o]me… the customs of the ordinary soldier, even if a mercenary
and un-mounted”.313 Even violations of civilian protections were often not motivated by
disregard of the laws of war. Because of the rapid increase in the size of armies, belligerents
were unable to properly fund and supply their troops. Many atrocities were perpetrated by
hungry soldiers who rampaged for survival.314
To prevent such atrocities, European rulers attempted to improve military law-enforcement,
often adopting new, extensive articles of war.315 Currently, the Swedish articles of war from
1621, issued during the Thirty Years’ War, are often marked as the turning point in this regard
and therefore revered as “the basis of… modern international humanitarian law.”316 In truth,
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many such attempts and articles have been drafted earlier, including during the French Wars of
Religion.317 Neither 1621 nor 1648 were turning points, because although penal enforcement of
the laws of war gradually improved during Early Modern Times, “amelioration was not linear
and even”.318 The current marking of a Thirty Years’ War-related event as the watershed is
simply another example of the Westphalian Myth’s lingering effect.
The French Wars of Religion ended with the regal Edict of Nantes, which referenced the
international crime of truce/peace breaching, in declaring that whoever resumed fighting would
be punished as “disturbers of peace” (“infracteurs de paix”).319 It further decreed certain
“disturbanc[es]” committed during the wars as being too grave for amnesty. These included
“rape, burning, murder, theft committed by treachery, ambuscade out of the line of regular
warfare to gratify private revenge, contrary to the laws of war” (“contre le devoir de la
guerre”).320 War-crime trials were subsequently conducted in accordance with the Edict.321
Similar legislation can be found elsewhere. “The Act for the Pacification between England
and Scotland of 1640” decreed that those who would resume fighting “ought to be punished as
breakers of the peace” and that amnesty “shall not… extend to… theeves, robbers, murtherers,
broaken-men [and] outlawers.”322 Seventeenth-century Scottish jurist, George Mackenzie,
explained that “the Pacification only secure[d] against acts of hostility which were done in furore
belli [fury of war]”, therefore its amnesty applied to killings “warrantable by the Law of Arms,”
but not to “privet murder” (e.g. unauthorized execution of POWs) or “Rap[e] upon a Woman”.323
2) The Eighty Years’ War (1568-1648) and the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648)
The Eighty Years’ War was a rebellion of the Protestant Dutch against Catholic Spain,
culminating in Dutch independence. Its later period blended with the Thirty Years’ War. In the
initial stages of the Eighty Years’ War, Spain waged total war against the Dutch, but Dutch
reprisals led the Spanish to recant and most of the conflict was conducted as between legitimate
belligerents.324 Spain’s adherence to jus in bello is evident in King Philip II’s appointment, in
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1574, of a judicial inquiry into accusations that the Duke of Alba, commander of the Spanish
forces, and his soldiers had violated the laws of war by causing disproportionate harm to the
civilian population. The Duke was acquitted, but “several of his senior officials were
banished.”325 The fact that the Spanish officers’ punishment took the form of banishment
indicates that the legal basis was outlawry-related, because the “banished” were outlaws whose
lives had been spared.326
Since the Eighty Years’ War was a religious rebellion, however, it is not surprising that
when a Dutchman was accused of war crimes by Spain (and thereby deemed an international
outlaw), his status as an ad bellum outlawed enemy was also claimed. This was the case with
King Philip’s 1580 decree outlawing William of Orange. Philip’s decree accused William of
treason, as William had originally served Spain. But William switched sides fourteen years
before the decree and therefore this was probably not Spain’s primary reason for the decree.
Indeed, the decree also accused William of more recent war-related wrongs, such as “persecuting
all the good pastors, preachers, monks, and upright persons [and having] a number
massacred.”327 Philip condemned William: “[F]or his evil doing: as chief disturber of the public
peace… outlaw[ed] him forever [and] declare[d] him an enemy of the human race” and “to
remove… his tyranny and oppression” promised a reward to anyone who would kill him.328
William was subsequently assassinated by a Catholic Frenchman.329
The following statement by contemporaneous Dutch jurist, Johannes Voet reveals that the
Dutch also enforced ICL during that war:330
[Soldiers sometimes] deprive [enemy soldiers] who surrendered of their lives in an
abominable, spontaneous act against the accepted laws of war. Since today’s wars
between civilized peoples do not permit such bestial conduct, and universal Christian
charity and the gentleness due to the other oppose it, it was decreed that whoever
committed an infamous act of this kind was to be banished from the allied provinces,
after having been expelled from [military] service. Indeed, a soldier was [even]
executed on July 10, 1638, because he had wounded two enemies, whom he knew well
to be captives, to the extent that they both died, not long after, from the injuries. Almost
the same punishment is set for those who, after a captive has paid off the ransom due
according to the laws of war, release him without the permission of the commander of
325
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the camp. For it may happen, that such captives are… guilty of [a grave] crime, whose
punishment with adequate sanctions is of interest to the Republic and is amongst the
duties of the commander…
This brief report is extremely telling. First, although most of the passage refers to penal
actions taken by the Dutch against their own soldiers, these soldiers’ wrong is described as an
“act against the accepted laws of war [and] universal Christian charity”. This indicates that the
Dutch applied a transnational doctrine (i.e. these penal actions should not be regarded as purely
domestic measures). Second, as explained, the fact that the punishment was either banishment or
death indicates that the wrong was considered outlawry-deeming. Third, there are not many
historical records of proceedings against low-ranking soldiers that reveal the doctrinal basis for
the punishment they received, because these were usually dispatched summarily. The case
mentioned by Voet is, therefore, rare evidence of the application of the outlawry doctrine in such
cases, suggesting that treating war criminals as outlaws was not simply political propaganda.
Fourth, the last sentence refers to the duty of commanders to punish captured belligerent soldiers,
pointing to a practice of punishing also enemy war criminals.
Finally, the case mentioned by Voet was from 1638, during the Thirty Years’ War. Jurists
currently regard that war as the archetypical total war.331 But despite the many unpunished
atrocities of that war, current historical research shows that portraying it as entirely lawless is an
exaggeration.332 Some enemy and compatriot war criminals were even prosecuted during that
war.333 The period’s leading international jurist, Dutchmen Hugo Grotius, accordingly noted that
it is “the usage of all Nations” to punish, on the basis of unwritten natural law, wartime enemy
violators of such law.334 This statement is further evidence for ICL’s existence at the time. It also
aids to refute the depiction of Grotius as the father of jus in bello, strengthening the conclusion
that that depiction is a lingering effect of the Westphalian Myth.
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The Thirty Years’ War
Crime

Punishment

In 1633, during the Thirty Years’ War, French artist Jacques Callot made a series of etchings
(each accompanied by a short poem) entitled The Miseries and Misfortunes of War.335 Callot
attempted to realistically depict the War, describing first the descent of a group of soldiers into a
life of (war) crime and, then, surprisingly, their punishment for their crimes (death by firing
squad, e.g., in etching twelve). The poem accompanying the first etching depicting war crimes
(etching four) describes, “The pretty name of booty their thieveries carry/They start fights
intentionally as enemies of tranquility.” Namely, immediately after they had committed their first
war crime (theft/pillage), they were deemed “enemies of tranquility” (outlaws). The poem
accompanying etching thirteen further refers to them as “enemies of the Heavens who sinned [a]
thousand times/Against the secret ordinances and divine laws.”
335
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3) The English Civil War (1642-1651)
The English Civil War was a religious war. Still, ICL was enforced during much of it: “[i]ntraarmy offenses were governed by processes of trial and punishment set out in articles of war,
while treatment of soldiers who fell into enemy hands was regulated by the [unwritten] laws of
war [and] an enemy who had offended against them was liable to punishment.”336
The trial of King Charles I (1649), following his defeat in this war, is another example of
ICL’s pervasive reliance on the international outlawry doctrine. It also illustrates the reasons for
the mistaken characterization of many past ICL cases as domestic legal measure. Since this was a
non-international conflict, and Charles was tried for treason against his own country, it is clear
why the ruling in his matter could be mistaken for a domestic case.
But, the legal ground for trying Charles, advanced by the Parliamentary army, was an
authority to prosecute “public officers [for] offence[s]… against the [unwritten] general law of
reason or nations.”337 He was tried not by a Common Law court, but by a special tribunal of
commissioners from the army and Parliament,338 which “adjudge[d], That the said Charles
Stuart, as a Tyrant, Traitor, Murderer, and a Public Enemy, shall be put to Death.”339 At trial, he
was also declared a “grand Disturber of the Peace”.340
Charles was convicted of international crimes. Even his conviction for treason cannot be
construed as the domestic form of treason because “king [Charles,] though imprisoned, was still
nominally sovereign.”341 Two international norms underpinned the accusations that Charles had
“traitorously and maliciously levied war against the present Parliament and the people therein
represented.”342 The first was a non-monarchical variation of the transnational predecessor of the
current domestic crime of treason.343 The second was the perfidious international crime of
reinitiating fighting in violation of a truce/peace treaty (in Charles’s case, with Parliament).344
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Charles’s murder conviction could not have been based on the common law crime of
murder, because breaching the “king’s peace” was an element of that domestic crime, and
Charles was King during the war.345 Charles was accused of murder for having engaged in
“unnatural, cruel and bloody wars”346 and convicted on the grounds that the prohibition against
murder “is universal… God’s law forbids it; Man’s law forbids it.”347
Charles’s tyranny conviction was a manifestation of post-medieval reinterpretation of this
international crime, reinstating the original Roman understanding of it as allowing the tyrant’s
subjects to rebel against him, but maintaining tyranny’s perception as an international crime
(fully consolidated only in late-medieval times).348 The tribunal’s Lord President, accordingly,
ruled that Roman law (regarded as international law) was the basis for the tyranny charge against
Charles, together with “precedents almost of all nations.”349
King Charles’ Execution350

Thomas Wilson lamented in a sermon, thirty-two years after Charles’ execution, that as a result
of the trial, “much more then hath the Seven Years’ War, not Deposed him only, but Outlawed
him, and defined him as an Alien, a Rebel to Law, an Enemy to the State.” 351
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4) The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) and Crimes Against Peace
Jus in bello was generally honored in eighteenth-century Western wars, mainly due to:
reforms in military justice (which, as discussed, begun earlier), the trauma of the Thirty Years’
War (whose horrors were exaggerated in the collective memory already in the seventeenth
century), and the formation of properly-funded, professional, standing armies (which gradually
replaced the poorly-supplied mercenary forces). “The officer class of these armies largely
comprised [of] nobility [that] saw themselves as the heirs of the knightly tradition and [thus]
generally conducted warfare… in accordance with the… law of warfare.”352 “There were, of
course, instances of crime, rioting, rape, and pillage… but military codes provided harsh
sanctions for these abuses [and] they were enforced”.353
The transnational nature of the period’s penal enforcement of the laws of war is apparent in
the common practice of contemporaneous belligerents to sign during wars treaties with their
enemies, whereby, if soldiers unaccompanied by an officer and less than an agreed-upon number
were captured, they could be “refused the treatment due to lawful enemies, and… punished as…
banditti”354 and “freebooters. By such steps [they] prevented a multitude of disorders and
enormities which entail ruin on the people”.355 Notice that the above-quoted, eighteenth-century
sources equate suspected war criminals to pirates (“freebooters”) and brigands (“banditti”),
demonstrating reliance on the international outlawry doctrine.
The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) was a large-scale conflict. Because most European
powers participated in it and because it was fought across the globe (in Europe, America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia), it is sometimes referred to as truly the “first world war.”356 Despite its large
scale, jus in bello was considerably enforced. For example, the military regulations of the
Prussian King, Fredrick II, considered to be the model handbook of European officers at the
time, prescribed corporeal punishment for “all [illegal] acts of violence, on whomsoever they are
committed, by soldiers” and as soon “as a complaint of this kind is made against any soldier, he
must be confined, examined, tried by a court-martial and sentenced.”357 Many war-crime trials
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were conducted during this war.358 Furthermore, this war is a significant event in ICL’s gradual
transformation into a global system, because the resources invested into it enabled imposing
“European norms of military conduct on North-American warfare.”359
It is currently often claimed that, unlike jus in bello, jus ad bellum was paid no more than a
lip service in the eighteenth century, and rulers were considered to have unrestrained war-making
discretion.360 It is also claimed that during that century the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity had solidified.361 But these are oversimplifications that fail to account for opposite
eighteenth-century views and actions,362 and most notably, disregard the wide contemporaneous
perception of Prussian King Fredrick II as an aggressor for invading Saxony in 1756. 363
Nineteenth-century historian, Thomas Carlyle, used a non-coincidental vocabulary to describe
this consensus, which existed “over all Europe, England alone excepted,” stating that “[t]he
extent of [Fredrick’s] sin… was at that time considered to transcend all computation, and to mark
him out for partition, for suppression and enchainment, as the general enemy of mankind”.364
Before that invasion, Fredrick drafted a manifesto listing several pretexts, but did not even
wait for the ultimatum he gave the Saxons to expire before attacking. In response, Fredrick was
declared an outlaw by the Protestant and Catholic princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire (who
rarely agreed), with the support of other European powers.365 Although the coalition against
Fredrick disintegrated before punishing him (due to the Russian Empress’ sudden death), the
consensus regarding his culpability shows that sovereigns did not enjoy immunity from
prosecution or unlimited discretion to initiate war.
Fredrick’s outlawry was not a domestic measure because the Holy Roman Empire was not a
single State. Moreover, as Emmerich de Vattel (the leading contemporaneous international jurist)
elucidated, the law of nations was the basis for that outlawry--issued by the Holy Roman
Empire’s princedoms with the support of “the most respectable powers of Europe”, as an action
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“recommended for the interest and safety of nations to repress he who tramples on rules [i.e.
rules of the law of nations] which constitute the unique foundation of their tranquility”.366
Note that Vattel referred to Fredrick as a disturber of international peace. Indeed, throughout
his work synonyms of “international outlaws” (such as, enemies of mankind) are used in
reference to violators of international laws including war criminals,367 career felons,368 and rulers
who violate ad bellum laws.369
The following are among the rulers Vattel considered enemies of mankind for violating jus
ad bellum: (a) warmongers370 and rulers who otherwise “tak[e] up arms without a lawful
cause”371 or “without necessity”;372 (b) rulers who conduct a war of destruction or commit
atrocities on a large scale;373 and (c) rulers who violate their treaty commitments.374 All three
categories were raised as the basis for Fredrick’s outlawry.375
As briefly demonstrated below, this combined accusation format has likely played a
significant role in the history of the international crime of “aggression” (“crime against
peace”).376 In jurisprudential writing, as Vattel’s work demonstrates, these were considered three
distinct international crimes. The first is currently considered the origin of “aggression”. The
second, rooted in tyranny, is what post-WWII jurists usually referred to by “aggression.”377 The
third originated from the medieval war crime of breaching a truce/peace treaty.378
It is currently assumed that all three charges, when made prior to Nuremberg, were political
cheap talk. But Lesaffer, based on an examination of early-modern State practice related to peace
treaties, rejected this account, at least regarding the third charge: “loyalty towards… treaties was
based on natural law and therefore offered a strong basis for positive international law.”379 For
early-modern jurists, “natural law was far more ‘law’ than natural law or even the law of nations
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was to the nineteenth century deniers of the legal character of international law,” 380 to the extent
that violations of some natural laws were “punishable by sovereigns, even if not committed
against themselves.”381 Lesaffer concluded that the Westphalian Myth’s lingering effect is the
cause of the false contemporary historical account.382
The charge of warring without a “just cause” became unreliable already in medieval
times.383 It is likely that those wishing to make a more credible “unjust cause” charge began
using the two other, more credible, charges. As a result, although in jurisprudential writing the
three charges remained distinct, in practice they had merged considerably. Such a combined
accusation is already found in Thomas of Marle’s case (1111-14), who was accused of (a)
violating his commitment to cease fighting; (b) provoking wars; and (c) “massacring and
destroying everything.”384 It is present in King Charles’s case where (a) the treason charge was
partly for reinitiating fighting in violation of his treaty commitment, and (b) the murder charge
was for engaging in cruel and bloody wars.385 It is present, as mentioned, in King Fredrick’s
case. It is also present in subsequent cases. Napoleon, e.g., was accused of “violating the
convention which established him in the Island of Elba” and of “reappearing in France with
projects of disorder and destruction.”386 A similar format was initially advanced against the
Kaiser,387 but because of opposition by positivist jurists,388 the Treaty of Versailles accused him
only of “a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” 389 At the
wake of WWII, the combined format was readopted; the Nuremberg Charter defined “Crimes
Against Peace [as] planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”390 and the Nuremberg tribunal
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amalgamated these charges.391 In “the Ministries Trial”, Frederick’s and Napoleon’s cases were
even explicitly regarded as precedents:392
Is there personal responsibility for those who plan, prepare, and initiate aggressive
wars and invasions? The defendants have ably and earnestly urged that heads of
states and officials thereof cannot be held personally responsible for initiating or
waging aggressive wars and invasions because no penalty had been previously
prescribed for such acts. History, however, reveals that this view is fallacious.
Frederick the Great was summoned by the Imperial Council to appear at Regensburg
and answer, under threat of banishment, for his alleged breach of the public peace in
invading Saxony. When Napoleon, in alleged violation of his international
agreement, sailed from Elba to regain by force the Imperial Crown of France, the
nations of Europe, including many German princes in solemn conclave, denounced
him, outlawing him as an enemy and disturber of the peace, mustered their armies,
and on the battlefield of Waterloo, enforced their decree, and applied the sentence by
banishing him to St. Helena. By these actions they recognized and declared that
personal punishment could be properly inflicted upon a head of state who violated an
international agreement and resorted to aggressive war.
Additional “cases [exist where] chiefs, or other high officers, of state were tried… for
initiating... aggressive war [both] in the middle-ages [and] in modern times.”393 Other criminal
cases, not against rulers, also demonstrate that it is “assumed, wrongly, that crimes against the
peace were not recognized violations of international law until the post-World War II trials.”394
Lesaffer concluded: “The continuity between the [early] modern era and the twentieth
century seems to be greater than is normally accepted… Of course, the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries saw the high days of State voluntarism in practice and of positivism in doctrine, but
that does not mean that there was no countercurrent.”395 This conclusion applies to the history of
crimes against peace.
5) The American Revolution (1775-1783)
In the initial stages of the American Revolution, the British deemed the American forces
outlaws (as rebels) and waged total war against them.396 In response, the American Founding
Fathers framed the Declaration of Independence as an indictment against King George III for
tyranny. The legal basis of the declaration was the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” and
George was declared a tyrant for “refus[ing] [his] Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and
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necessary for the public good” and for waging a war of destruction, as he “plundered our seas,
ravaged our coasts, burned our towns [and] transport[ed] large armies of foreign mercenaries to
complete the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of
cruelty and perfidy… totally unworthy of the head of a civilized nation.”397 Although these are
political statements, they demonstrate contemporaneous legal and political mindset and should
not be dismissed. Furthermore, after the war’s initial stages, the sides agreed to treat each other
as civilized nations. Subsequently, actions “against prisoners of war and enemy civilians were…
regarded as crimes, and were often punished [and these practices] were too consistent and far too
frequently repeated not to have some significance beyond internal control of one’s troops.”398
The American Revolution

Captain Lippincott was a royalist who executed an American POW. In response, Washington sent
a letter to British General Clinton, implicitly threatening to execute British POWs in reprisal if
Lippincott were not turned over to be tried by the Americans. Clinton replied (in his letter
above399) by referring to Lippincott’s act as an “outrage against humanity”. He also did not deny
the Americans’ authority to prosecute Lippincott, but stated it was preferable that “violators of
the law of war [were to be] punished by the Generals under whose power they act.”
397
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6) The French Revolution (1789-1799)
The French and American revolutions are commonly depicted as marking the end of the
eighteenth century era of limited warfare because armed-forces became conscripted national
armies with diminished commitment to the laws of war.400 But the effect of this transition should
not be exaggerated: military characteristics changed gradually, and the commitment to the laws
of war was not abandoned.401 Accordingly, cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war can be
found during the French Revolution402 and subsequent wars.403
The French Revolution was not merely an internal conflict; British and other European
forces fought alongside the French King. The Revolutionary Convention declared the British
Prime Minister, William Pitt, “an enemy of mankind”, so that “everyone [would] have the right
to assassinate him” because he was a “tyrant.”404 Specifically, the revolutionists contended that
Pitt was responsible for the persistent violation of the laws of nations by British forces. 405 This
declaration and similar actions indicate reliance on the international outlawry doctrine.406
French King Louis XVI was tried by the Convention for tyranny and treason, and was
convicted of treason. The basis for that trial was the law of nations and not domestic French
law.407 During his trial, based on the “state of nature” conception, many revolutionaries
advocated that human rights are inherent in the law of nature.408 They later abused this lofty idea,
erecting upon it a doctrine whereby all who opposed equal rights--namely, all Royalists and their
foreign and domestic supporters--were “enemies of humanity,” and outlaws (“hors-la-loi”), who
could be tried and executed by summary military proceedings.409
The French Revolution410
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c. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
In the nineteenth century, ICL’s legitimacy was challenged by the rise of modern Positivism.
As discussed, many positivists opposed punishment for violating norms not formally prescribed
by domestic legislation. Some further rejected ICL either because they considered international
law inapplicable to individuals or because they altogether dismissed the validity of international
law.411 Despite such challenges, ICL persevered.
One reason for positivism’s limited effect is its tendency to attribute significance to
prevailing legal practice.412 For centuries, captured enemy violators of the laws of war were
predominantly prosecuted by military tribunals. Due to that State practice, many nineteenthcentury positivists--while asserting that domestic civilian courts did not have authority to
prosecute enemy war criminals--acknowledged, as customary law, the military tribunals’
authority to do so.413 For example, in Coleman v. Tennessee--concerning a Union soldier that
murdered a Southern civilian during the American Civil War--the American Supreme Court
ruled that, while the enemy’s domestic courts lacked jurisdiction, had that Union soldier “been
caught by the forces of the enemy after committing the offense, he might have been subjected to
a summary trial and punishment by order of their commander, and there would have been no just
ground of complaint, for the marauder and the assassin are not protected by any usages of
civilized warfare.”414 This position indicates an ICL-related practice before and during the
nineteenth century. Other jurists, one should note, opposed this position, arguing that any court
(military or civilian) is authorized to punish war criminals.415
Another reason for nineteenth-century positivism’s limited impact on ICL was the
persistence of a divide between military and civilian societies. As a result of the codification of
domestic law, by the end of the nineteenth century, positivism supplanted natural law
jurisprudence in domestic legal discourse.416 In contrast, throughout the nineteenth century and
in the first half of the twentieth century, the laws of war remained predominantly the domain of
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the military subculture and of its autonomous justice system. 417 This subculture was conservative
and tended to resist legal reform.418 Hence, the unwritten laws of war continued serving as its
predominant basis for punishing war criminals.419
Arguably, the main influence of nineteenth-century positivism on the laws of war was the
role it played in advancing their codification.420 Codifying treaties were not, however, premised
exclusively on positivism. The Martens Clause of the Hague Convention even implied that States
and their agents were subordinate to unwritten, universal natural law.421
In many respects, ICL expanded in the nineteenth century. Notably, slave-trading became an
international crime, following an international effort to declare it “a form of piracy in the hopes
of making slave traders, like pirates, hostis humani generis… subject to capture and trial in the
court of any nation.”422 Slave-traders were also referred to as “piratical outlaws.”423 The analogy
with piracy was not attributed only to similar practical difficulties of condemning the
perpetrators’ ships; rather, it also derived considerably from viewing slave-traders as the enemies
of mankind because of their violation of natural law (natural human rights).424
Cases of penal enforcement of the laws of war exist not only from the first half of the
nineteenth century,425 but also from conflicts during its second half and at the turn of the century,
including the Crimean War (1853-1856);426 American Civil War (1861-1865),427 Franco-German
War (1870-1871),428 Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878),429
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1902),430 Spanish/Philippines-American Wars (1898-1902),431 and Russian-Japanese War (19041905).432 Ergo, the practice of punishing individual violators of the laws of war clearly persisted
long after the rise of positivism.
Evidence suggests that ICL continued to rest on an outlawry doctrine. This emerges from:
the rationale underlying the outlawing of slave-trading, the attempt to punish Napoleon, the war
crime prosecutions of the American Civil War and additional nineteenth-century cases.433
Only at the turn of the twentieth century did ICL begin to be compromised because of
growing endorsement even within the armed-forces of doctrines aimed at nullifying it. The
Kriegsraison doctrine, whereby a State could disregard the laws of war if mandated by national
necessity, gained increasing support, particularly in Germany.434 Support for the “Act of State”
and “Respondeat Superior” doctrines also grew; the former barred the prosecution of war
criminals if their crime had been endorsed by their State, and the latter prohibited prosecution
when their crime was ordered by their commanders.435 British and American military law
manuals adopted both doctrines shortly before WWI, and they remained there until nearly the
end of WWII, sparking claims that they had become customary law.436
Closer examination of State practice reveals that although weakened, ICL was never
abandoned. Admittedly, during WWI, some German submariners who had participated in attacks
against civilian ships were not tried by their British captors, and some British officials argued
that international law demanded refraining from such prosecution.437 But after deliberation, the
British government adopted an opposite position438 and punished other German soldiers for their
war crimes.439 France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary also punished enemy war criminals, without
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applying the Act of State and Respondeat Superior doctrines.440 Even Germany, after initial
reluctance, punished enemy war criminals.441
Outlawry was often explicitly cited as the basis for punishing war criminals during WWI.
Phillipson, e.g., reported: “captured soldiers or sailors who have violated the laws of war are not
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war; they are, on the contrary, liable to be tried by courtmartial as war criminals [Accordingly, in 1915, a] number of German airmen, who fell into the
hands of the Russians after they had dropped bombs on the open town of Libau… were informed
that on account of their illegitimate conduct they would be treated as common outlaws.”442
WWI: The New-Zealand Herald 8 (February 5, 1915)

Germans were not the only nationals to be declared international outlaws. In response to an
attack against the British Embassy in Petrograd, in 1918, the British government sent an official
dispatch to the Soviet government stating that unless those responsible for the attack were
punished, Britain would hold the Bolshevik leaders individually responsible and “use every
endeavour to have them treated as outlaws by the Governments of all civilized nations, and that
no place of refuge shall be left to them.”443 In his legal analysis of this case, Lefroy stated: “[i]n
the absence of any international court with power at its disposal to hale offending members of
440
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foreign governments before it, and administer punishment, the last resort is outlawry, just as
outlawry was the last weapon of ancient law… To pursue the outlaw, to knock him on the
head… is the right and duty of every law-abiding man.”444
WWI sources also reveal that “conventional” war criminals were equated with pirates and
brigands. The underlying rationale was that soldiers who violate the laws of war place
themselves “on a level with bandits and outlaws,” and therefore can “be summarily tried,
condemned, and shot” or punished “by judicial tribunals.”445
WWI: The Fielding Star (November 2, 1918)

ICL was therefore not abandoned. The legal upheavals at the turn of the twentieth century
should be more accurately understood as the product of a struggle between supporters of certain
brands of positivism, seeking to restrict or abolish ICL, and ICL supporters.
Admittedly, the Kaiser was ultimately not prosecuted (Holland refused to extradite him) and
after the war German soldiers were prosecuted by a German tribunal for violating domestic
German law in Leipzig.446 But by signing the Treaty of Versailles, the “German Government
recogni[zed] the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals
persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war,” 447 and
the authority of an international tribunal to prosecute the Kaiser “for a supreme offence against
444
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international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”448 Similar provisions existed in the treaties of
surrender signed with other States, and, in some of these States war crimes trials were
conducted.449 Also, as a compromise between the allies and Holland, “Queen Wilhelmina
interned the Kaiser in the province of Utrecht as ‘alien dangerous to the public tranquility’.”450
Thus, formally, the Kaiser was, in fact, treated summarily like Napoleon.451
The outlawry doctrine was also applied during WWII and, in its aftermath, supporters of
both summary executions and judicial proceedings invoked that doctrine.452 In fact, the contrast
between the two positions was not as sharp as currently portrayed, as seen in a report from 1945
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson to President Truman, “on the legal basis for the
trial of war criminals.” Although Jackson supported the trial of arch-war-criminals (deeming
them “international brigands” for violating international law), regarding low-ranking enemy war
criminals he argued that “field forces from time immemorial have dealt with such offenses on the
spot” and suggested the “prompt resumption of summary dealing with this type of case.”453
Understandably, many regarded the atrocities of the two world wars as proof that
international law had always been ineffective and thus had never been truly positive law.454 From
a historical perspective, however, this conclusion is wrong: “Any normative body of rules will
invariably be broken, perhaps on a small scale or perhaps even on a much larger one, but this
does not stop it from being a law in the sense of a prescription towards adopting a particular
mode of behaviour, or an articulation of accepted values.”455 Many of those involved in postWWII war crime prosecutions did not consider them to be a break with the past. The Nuremberg
Tribunal, e.g., rejected defendant claims (echoing positivist opponents of ICL) that it lacked
authority to prosecute them for violating the Hague Regulations because these addressed only
States,456 by stating that: “For many years past… military tribunals have tried and punished
individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare… The law of war is to be found not only
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in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal
recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts.”457 Note that this ruling reveals that the contemporary narrative, which views ICL as a
post-WWII creation, gained complete acceptance only sometime after WWII.
6. Crimes against Humanity
Some contemporary jurists acknowledge that war crimes were prosecuted even before
WWII, usually assuming that this “category of international crimes gradually emerged in the
second half of the nineteenth century”.458 But they still regard Nuremberg as a “crucial turning
point [because] two new categories of crimes were envisioned: crimes against peace and crimes
against humanity.”459 As already shown, the former were recognized before Nuremberg. As
briefly shown below crimes against humanity were not a post-WWII innovation, either.460
Jurists assume that the term “crimes against humanity” was first used in its current meaning
in 1915, in an official Joint Protest by France, Britain, and Russia to Turkey, against the
Armenian Massacre, which these States called the “new crimes of Turkey against humanity [and]
announce[d]… that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the
Ottoman Government… implicated in such massacres.”461 In 1919, the majority in a post-WWI
allied legal commission employed synonyms of the term “crimes against humanity” when
recommending criminal responsibility for “offences”, “outrages”, “violations” and “breaches” of
“the laws of humanity”.462 These two failed initiatives to internationally criminalize “crimes
against humanity” presumably inspired the post-WWII success.
Earlier “references to ‘humanity’” are acknowledged with regard to violations of the laws of
war. But they are dismissed for lacking the intention to indicate “a set of norms different from
‘the laws and customs of war.’” 463 References to humanity are also acknowledged in the context
of nineteenth-century humanitarian interventions. But, it is claimed to be “a leap of faith to take
from such interventions evidence of an international crime [because] the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was… not any rule for trying foreign nationals.”464
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Even pre-1915 uses of the explicit term “crimes against humanity” are acknowledged.
Presumably “Voltaire coined the term”, in the late-eighteenth century, in reference to crimes
such as murder and it was used, subsequently, in such a context. But a clear explanation for the
connection between the term’s contemporary meaning and its use in reference to seemingly
domestic crimes is currently not provided.465 The term “crimes against humanity” is also known
to have been used in nineteenth-century statements condemning war crimes, slave-trading, and
colonial atrocities. But, these statements are considered mere moral condemnations.466
ICL’s long history helps to connect the dots. The term “law of humanity” originally
indicated international law, and “crimes against humanity,” and similar terms, meant
international crimes. Accordingly, it was stated that: war crimes were acts “trampl[ing] on the
laws of humanity,”467 “pirates… have for ages defied the laws of… humanity,468 and slavery was
a “crime against humanity.”469 Felonies, such as murder, since they were considered
international crimes, were referred to as “crimes contre l’humanité” long before Voltaire.470
Felonies were also called “common law crimes,” (namely common to the laws of all States).471
Atrocities had been referred to as “crimes against humanity” before 1915. Although the
Boxer War (1900-1901) is rightly infamous for its colonial undertones, it was also a
humanitarian intervention by a joint military force from Germany, Austria-Hungary, US, France,
Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia in response to atrocities in which “more than 200 foreign
missionaries and 30,000 Chinese Christians were killed.”472 In 1900, a “Joint Note” to China,
signed by eleven States (the States of the joint force, Belgium, Spain, and Holland), demanded
the punishment of the principal perpetrators, whose actions were deemed “crimes against the law
of nations, against the laws of humanity”.473 Subsequently, unlike in the Armenian case, many
perpetrators were tried and punished, including by the allies.474
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The Boxer War

Segments of the 1900 “Joint Note”, as published in The Oamaru Mail (13 February, 1901).475
In various nineteenth-century interventions, we also find contemporaneous references to
atrocities as crimes against humanity.476 Contrary to present-day belief, during such interventions
the perpetrators of the atrocities were often prosecuted477--occasionally by military tribunals of
the intervening powers.478 Some such interventions and subsequent trials were even in response
to “peacetime” atrocities, which contradicts the Nuremberg Tribunal’s premise that such
prosecutions were unprecedented.479 That ruling of the Nuremberg tribunal was probably
influenced by a popular moderate positivist position that recognized only the authority to
prosecute foreigners for wartime violations of international law (and for piracy).480
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Perpetrators of Boxer atrocities were referred to as “disturbers of the peace,”481 Likewise, in
a list from 1918, the principal perpetrators of the Armenian Massacre were referred to as
“outlaws of civilization”.482 Such references demonstrate that the international outlawry doctrine
was applied in such cases.
Until the nineteenth century, the legal basis for military intervention was tyranny. As an ad
bellum doctrine, it granted universal permission to fight the tyrant and his men. In the context of
such interventions, rulers were, usually, declared tyrants for committing or condoning atrocities
(namely, mass war crimes or felonies).483
From the nineteenth century onward, the legal basis justifying military interventions was
usually protecting humanity, not tyranny.484 But, the transition was not abrupt: we find prenineteenth century sources referencing commitment to humanity485 and nineteenth century
sources citing tyranny486 to justify intervention.
In the nineteenth century, under the influence of positivism, support for universal
jurisdiction diminished, together with support for prosecution based on unlegislated norms and
for considering felonies international crimes.487 Some even opposed the prosecution of war
crimes because they were unlegislated prohibitions.488 But, even among continental civilian
jurists, a minority still supported universal jurisdiction for “common law crimes” (felonies).489
Many more jurists asserted that States had authority to prosecute war crimes, despite these
prohibitions being unlegislated. Their legal reasoning was that the different acts of war “contain
all the essentials of criminal acts” such as “pillage, theft, incendiarism, violence, rape, robbery,
assassination, maltreatment of prisoners and the like” and “[w]hat deprives [them] of the element
of criminality is their conformity to the rules of international law”; therefore, when they are
committed in violation of “the law of nations, they are analogous to ordinary crimes and may be
punished as such”--namely, as “crimes under the common criminal law”.490 This position echoes
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the medieval doctrine that considered unauthorized wartime taking of life or property (war
crimes) as felonies.
After WWII a nearly identical doctrine was advanced to justify prosecuting crimes against
humanity. According to that doctrine, the prosecution of such crimes was not punishment based
on retroactive law, because the acts listed as crimes against humanity were “common law crimes
such as theft, looting, ill-treatment, enslavement, murders and assassinations, crimes provided for
and punishable under the penal laws of all civilized States” (including Germany).491 In
proceedings after Nuremberg, this doctrine became the basis for the post-WWII criminalization
of both peacetime and wartime crimes against humanity.492
Thus, the contemporary prohibition of crimes against humanity is not a post-WWII
innovation. It gradually emerged, in the context of military interventions, based on the historical
perception of the wrongs that comprise atrocities (murder, theft, robbery, arson, and rape) as
international crimes, or crimes against humanity.493
Nevertheless, there have been changes. Currently, a connection between the prohibition of
crimes against humanity and human rights is considered essential.494 This connection did not
always exist, but neither was it invented at Nuremberg. Post-WWII proceedings “had little to do
with individual human rights,” and only the current human-rights-orientation of ICL has led to a
“retrospective reinterpretation of [these proceedings’] impetus.”495 The difference between postWWII and contemporary ICL is most evident when the corresponding colloquial definitions of
crimes against humanity are compared. According to their post-WWII colloquial definition,
crimes against humanity were “common crime[s], punishable under municipal law [that
transformed] into… crime[s] against humanity, [because] either by their magnitude [or] savagery
[they] shocked the conscience of mankind”.496 By contrast, according to the current colloquial
491
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definition, “[c]rimes against humanity are extreme, systematic or widespread violations of
international human rights law that shock the human conscience.”497
Three additional factors must be mentioned. First, unlike its colloquial definition, the formal
definition of crimes against humanity (the acts listed as prohibited crimes against humanity),
based on which individuals have been prosecuted, has not changed dramatically since the
Nuremberg Charter.498 This means that the continuity is greater than the aforementioned
compression of colloquial definitions conveys.
Second, although most ICL applications even in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries
were not human-rights-oriented,499 human-rights-oriented conceptualizations of crimes against
humanity had been applied already during the French Revolution,500 in nineteenth century
interventions,501 and regarding the slave trade.502 Namely, that change was the result of a
nonlinear process.
Third, contemporary jurists, when referring to the Joint Protest against the Armenian
Massacre, usually make it a point to mention that the Russians initially offered using the term
“crimes against Christianity”, but the French proposed the more inclusive term “crimes against
humanity” instead. Such jurists wish through this mentioning to allude to international law’s
globalization (which presumably occurred only in recent times).503 But, this occurrence actually
demonstrates something else. Originally, ICL was a trans-Christian criminal justice system,
whose community viewed itself as “mankind”/“humanity”. Therefore, cases, such as that of
Thomas of Marle, exist where the terms “humanity” and “Christians” were used interchangeably
and the term “enemy to the name of Christian” was used as a synonym of “enemy of
mankind”.504 As ICL secularized during Early Modern Times, the term “Europe” gradually
substituted Christendom as the term used--alongside “mankind”/“humanity”--in reference to the
transnational community addressed by international law.505 Cases, accordingly, exist, such as
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Napoleon’s case, where both the term “the Tranquility of the World” 506 and the term “the
Tranquility of Europe”507 were used. But, the Russian suggestion to use the term “crimes against
Christianity” reveals that that substitution was not fully adopted even in 1915. Thus, it only
demonstrates the protracted nature of ICL’s transition into a global system. This transition was
also nonlinear, as evident in the existence of pre-1915 references to atrocities committed against
non-Christians as crimes against humanity.508 In sum, over the course of the legal history of
crimes against humanity changes often occurred in a protracted and nonlinear manner, and our
recollection of that history differs considerably from reality.
7. Current Historical Narrative
Several factors that contributed to the pretermission of ICL’s long history have been
mentioned thus far. First, the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War were exaggerated. Second, the
Peace of Westphalia was an important milestone in the history of modern States. Third, the two
preceding occurrences were relied upon in the nineteenth century to construct the Westphalian
Myth, and with its aid, positivist conceptualizations of States and of international law were
retroactively committed to memory. Fourth, by the turn of the twentieth century, anti-ICL
positivist positions were accepted even within armed-forces. Fifth, the horrors of the world wars
led many opponents and supporters of ICL alike to the exaggerated conclusion that international
law had never been effective positive law.
Two more recent factors also contributed to that pretermission. One was the Cold War,
during which there was considerable loss of confidence in international law and a neartermination of its application, including that of ICL.509 Another is the change in the legal
background of jurists engaging in ICL. Western military law has been undergoing a process of
“civilianization” since WWII.510 Also, when ICL resurfaced in the 1990s, it was no longer
dominated by military jurists--civilian human-rights-oriented lawyers took the lead.511 Thus, the
legal background of most military and civilian jurists currently engaged in ICL is primarily
domestic jurisprudence. Individuals have an unconscious tendency to extrapolate from personal
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experience and prevailing paradigms. This tendency, as mentioned, has led to the “Modern State
Conception,” resulting in the misguided assumption that criminal justice is by nature a State
function. This tendency also often leads individuals to project current paradigms and personal
experiences onto the past.512 Contemporary jurists, accordingly, mistakenly assume that: (a) nondomestic criminal law has long been an exceptional or non-existent phenomenon, (b) military
justice was always a branch of the domestic legal system, and (c) a clear jurisprudential divide
has long separated domestic from international law. Therefore, although ICL emerged
triumphant at the end of the Cold War, the pre-WWII historical narrative of its opponents
became the consensus.
One clarification is in order, however. The change in jurists’ legal background was gradual.
The horrors of modern warfare led to some civilian involvement in the development of the laws
of war already during the late nineteenth century,513 and civilian involvement intensified with
each world war.514 This involvement was influenced by the nineteenth-century rise of the modern
international legal profession. By the early twentieth century, this mostly civilian profession held
predominantly positivist views. But, unlike supporters of previously discussed brands of
positivism, many members of this profession reinterpreted positivist premises, or incorporated
natural law elements into their positions, to reclaim international law.515 Accordingly, although
some such jurists accepted the positivist account of international law unquestioningly, unlike
positivist opponents of ICL, they argued that the horrors of war affirmed the need to reform this
law, to include individual responsibility for violations of the laws of war. Thus, already in the
nineteenth century some pro-ICL jurists considered it non-existent.516 Other pro-ICL jurists, by
contrast, who more aware of military practices, acknowledged ICL’s long history even after
WWII.517 In sum, the rise of the contemporary narrative was a long, disorderly process, resulting
from the actions of both opponents and proponents of ICL.
8. The Harms of the Current Narrative
Contemporary jurists do not blindly accept all nineteenth-century positivist narratives.
Although historical inaccuracy alone warrants the debunking of the Westphalian Myth, it is no
512

Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 (1969), 6-7.
DiMeglio, Law of Armed-Conflict, 14.
514
Kennedy, “International Law,” 110.
515
Hall, “The Persistent Spectre,” 271; Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 179-209, 274-302.
516
E.g., ICRC President, Gustave Moynier, “Note sur la création d’une institution judiciaire internationale propre à
prévenir et à réprimer les infractions à la Convention de Genève,” Bulletin International 11 (April 1872): 125-26.
517
E.g., Trial of the Major War Criminals, 1:221.
513

76

-DRAFT-

coincidence that this occurred in parallel with the post-Cold War reawakening of international
law. Those refuting the myth sought to strengthen the legitimacy of international law by showing
that adherence to transnational legal norms and institutions was a longstanding social practice,
and that a State with unlimited sovereignty never existed.518
Nevertheless, ICL’s pre-Nuremberg history remains unacknowledged, and both opponents
and supporters of ICL continue to assume that it was created only after WWII to punish
individuals based on retroactive law, and thereby in violation of core principles of justice. ICL
supporters are, thus, forced to justify ICL’s supposed past injustices and persuade skeptics that
today ICL is far more just than it was at its “birth.”519 But legitimizing a system with an
allegedly questionable track record is a difficult task,520 especially when opponents exploit the
accepted narrative to assert that what was “born in sin” can never become just.521
Two misguided assumptions with positivist origins explain why debunking the Westphalian
myth has had little effect on ICL. One is the premise that criminal justice is by nature a State
function; the other the belief that there is a longstanding clear jurisprudential divide between
domestic and international law. Based on these assumptions, jurists tend to focus on the actions
of international tribunals.522 Many even adopt an institution-oriented definition of ICL, as
opposed to a broader, norms-oriented one. Under the broader definition, any case in which ICL
norms are enforced should be regarded as an action of the international criminal justice system,
even if adjudicated by a municipal court. By contrast, under the narrower institution-oriented
definition, war crimes prosecuted in municipal courts are considered to be domestic actions.
Only rulings rendered by tribunals that cannot be considered domestic organs (e.g., because
judges are not all subject to a single sovereign) are regarded as ICL actions.523 Based on the
institution-oriented definition, many jurists conclude that, regardless of any pre-WWII war
crimes prosecution, ICL was born at Nuremberg, supposedly the first transnational criminal
tribunal (or the second, for those who remember von-Hagenbach).524 ICL opponents further point
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to such tribunals’ alleged novelty to support their claim that these tribunals, and ICL in general,
are anomalies, placing on ICL supporters the heavy burden of justifying what is considered a
deviation from the general norm.525
But, the institution-oriented definition of ICL is flawed because its rests on false premises
(already refuted in this article). First, until the nineteenth century there was generally no sharp
distinction between international and domestic criminal law. Second, for centuries, when
enforcing international laws, armed-forces considered their penal forums to be organs of a
transnational criminal justice network.526 Thus, pre-WWII cases adjudicated by these military
forums should be regarded as ICL precedents.
An overlooked expression of the transnational network ethos is the fairly common,
centuries-long practice of military powers to form transnational criminal tribunals to punish warrelated and intervention-related violations of international law. Scilicet, Nuremberg was not the
first, neither only the second, transnational criminal tribunal. Prominent examples of such
overlooked tribunals are the Imperial Chamber Court and Aulic Council (1490s-1806), which
gradually transformed into international tribunals, as princedoms of the Holy Roman Empire
became sovereign States.527 Their jurisdiction went beyond the non-penal, post-Westphalian
authority, previously mentioned. These tribunals were originally created to punish “disturbers of
the peace,” in the sense of individuals who initiated illegal wars (committed aggression) within
the Holy Roman Empire’s realm, and they also had jurisdiction over the international crime of
tyranny when it was committed by rulers of the Holy Roman Empire’s princedoms. 528 Prussian
King Fredrick’s outlawry was, actually, a sentence rendered by the Aulic Council, subsequently
confirmed by the empire’s princedoms and supported by other European powers. 529 Although
efforts to punish Fredrick failed, other sentences were successfully enforced, as Trim notes:530
[T]he Imperial Aulic Council… had its composition altered at Westphalia, making it both a
more representative and a far more consensual body. In consequence, in the late
seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century it was more active and
assertive, intervening [to] constrain tyrannical rulers. On numerous occasions over the
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century following Westphalia, ruling princes were deposed, or suspended from power, by
the Council, ‘for… disturbing the peace… and abuse of power.’ They included…WilliamHyacinth of Nassau-Siegen [who] ‘was sanctioned in 1709 for mistreating his Protestant
subjects’ [and] [t]he ‘tyrannical Duke Karl Leopold of Mecklenburg’ [who was]
‘eventually deposed in 1728’ on the grounds of his repeated attempts, using harsh
measures, to deprive his subjects ‘of their age-old privileges, freedoms and rights.’
…[T]hese interventions… show that the notion… that some types of princely behavior
were simply too extreme to be countenanced by other princes was widely accepted.
Despite the Westphalian ‘myth,’ this remained true in the century after Westphalia.
The Imperial Chamber Court and Aulic Council are only two examples of transnational
criminal tribunals. Such (usually ad hoc) tribunals existed in every century, from the late MiddleAges onward.531 I avoided discussing the history of such tribunals at length, mainly because
focusing on them would lend legitimacy to the flawed institution-oriented definition of ICL,
which this article challenges.
The narrow, institution-oriented definition reflects jurisprudential shortsightedness, even
regarding current ICL. Even contemporary positivists acknowledge that occasionally more than
one legal system applies to the same group of people. In these situations the competing legal
systems often reach a compromise, whereby both systems agree on the content of the legal
arrangement to be applied, but “agree to disagree” on the origins of individuals’ duty to abide by
this legal arrangement, each one asserting that the obligatory force of its own laws is the source
of that duty.532 A quintessential example of such a compromise is the relationship between the
EU legal system and domestic European legal systems. Are the rulings of domestic courts
enforcing EU directives considered the judicial action of the domestic legal system, or of the
transnational (EU) system? The answer depends on who is being asked. Constitutional courts of
member-States insist that domestic courts’ duty to apply EU law derives from domestic law that
gives force to EU norms. The European Court of Justice maintains that these courts are dutybound to apply EU law because that transnational law supersedes the members’ domestic
laws.533 Domestic rulings enforcing EU law should therefore be objectively labeled as
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simultaneously the case-law of both the transnational and domestic legal systems. The same
observation applies to ICL. Namely, even today, prosecution of core international crimes
conducted at the State level should be considered the case-law of both the domestic and
international criminal justice systems.
The myopic view of ICL that overemphasizes the proceedings of international tribunals not
only reinforces the disregard for its pre-WWII history, but also leads to the underestimation of
ICL’s current effectiveness, in discounting the majority of ICL cases for not having been tried by
international tribunals. For example, the prosecution of a few high-ranking officials at
Nuremberg and Tokyo is a minor chapter in the saga of post-WWII prosecutions, the subsequent
prosecution, in various countries, of tens of thousands of WWII perpetrators of core international
crimes is simply usually overlooked.534 Similarly, current criticism of ICL’s effectiveness is
often based on the fact that only a few cases have been prosecuted in recent decades by
international tribunals.535 But, a survey revealed that the international pressure applied during
1993-2008 to involved States to end impunity--through the conviction of 112 perpetrators of core
international crimes, based on universal jurisdiction, mainly by international tribunals--resulted
in, “[m]ore than 10,000 perpetrators [being] brought to justice in [involved] countries.”536 Thus,
the excessive attention directed at international tribunals leads to an underestimation of ICL’s
effectiveness, resulting, again, in an unjustified questioning of its legitimacy.
Conclusion
Myths are a powerful, persistent social force. Some can even be harmful, as they shape our
outlook on important issues based on false information. Because myths can subconsciously
affect even the behavior of those who are aware of their falsehood, it is often necessary to
consciously combat their effect.537
In recent decades, scholars showed that international law had suffered from the harmful
effect of the Westphalian Myth. Exposing its fallacy aided to legitimize the now-flourishing
international law: State sovereignty ceased to be conceived as a longstanding social fact, and
international law is no longer viewed as a recent assault on that sovereignty.
534

Ciara Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (2008), 104-113.
E.g., Jeremy Rabkin, “Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed,” Cornell International Law
Journal 38 (2005): 767-768.
536
Joseph Rikhof, “Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Criminals Prosecution on International
Impunity,” Criminal Law Forum 20 (2009): 51.
537
Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth (1997), 41; Beaulac, “Westphalian Model,” 186-188.
535

80

-DRAFT-

But, the Westphalian Myth has had stronger ramifications than commonly acknowledged.
Aided by other factors, it generated the “Nuremberg Myth,” according to which ICL is a postWWII creation, dismissing the relevance of pre-WWII cases to present-day ICL. This article
refuted the claims currently presented as bases for that dismissal. It showed that ICL has
developed in a process spanning centuries, continuously anchored in the same transnational
doctrine and that throughout its long history ICL enforcement was far from negligible. The
current fixation on international tribunals was also shown to be misguided.
The article does not intend to belittle the significance of the international criminal tribunals
created since WWII. Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Myth’s harmful effects cannot be ignored. It
leads to the disregard of most ICL cases (those adjudicated at the State level), which results in a
grave underestimation of ICL’s effectiveness, past and present. Furthermore, the related
mistaken view that ICL was born in sin cast doubt about its capacity for justice. For all these
reasons, and for historical accuracy, the Nuremberg Myth must be set aside and the true,
centuries-long history of ICL acknowledged.
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